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ARTICLE
Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to
the System
Camilla E. Watson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most elusive area of law is that of legal ethics. While the
term itself is easy to define,' the subject all but defies codification2
because ethics, or morals (the terms are interchangeable), cannot be
encapsulated by or in law. This is because law, in general, contains its
own standard of validity on which there is usually clear societal
consensus. For example, murder, rape, and theft are morally repugnant
universally. Hence, punishment for any of these offenses does not
impinge upon religious or individual autonomy because there is no ethical
freedom to choose whether or not to engage in the conduct that would
constitute the offense.3
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia, School of Law. B.A., Converse College; J.D.,
University of Mississippi; LL.M. (in taxation), New York University. A version of this Article was
presented at the Conference on Professionalism at the University of Kansas School of Law on April
2-3, 1998. 1 thank Dean Michael H. Hoeflich for inviting me to participate in this conference. I am
grateful to Leigh W. Bauer, Walter Hellerstein, Edward D. Spurgeon, and Alan Watson for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "[tihat branch of moral science which treats of the
duties which a member of the legal profession owes to the public, to the court, to his professional
brethren, and to his client." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (6th ed. 1990). A related term is
"professional responsibility," which refers to the rules of conduct that govern the legal profession.
See id at 1210. Note, however, that the term "legal ethics" is a misnomer because law and ethics
have different foundations, and thus are different species of the same genus. See infra text
accompanying notes 4-5.
2. For a general criticism of the codification of professional ethics, see Steven R. Salbu, Law
and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The Trouble with Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND.
L.J. 101 (1992); see also DANMiEL R. COQILLETrE, LAW-YERS AND FUNDAMENTAL MoRAL
RESPONSIBILITY, at xv (1995) ("The most important problems often cannot be solved by a simple or
standardized process, at least not by individuals who value their moral characters.").
3. See Salbu, supra note 2, at 103 -06 (discussing the fallacies of codes of professional ethics).
Of course, on occasion there may be some laws that may not have clear societal consensus because
many people may regard the law as immoral. In general, however, law rests on a foundation of clear
societal consensus.
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Rules of ethics, however, rest on a very different foundation. They
may be either absolute, like law, or motivational (determined by the
motivation of the actor), or consequential (judged by their foreseeable
consequences). But in some cases there may be no single correct answer,
or clear societal consensus, to a controversial and complex ethical
question. Thus, canonizing an ethical rule addressing the particular
problem deprives the individual of ethical autonomy and imposes an
element of coercion that may not be justified in every case.4 The very
nature of a lawyer's representation and protection of a client means that
the lawyer is likely to be faced with continually conflicting decisions as
to what must be done to act legally and in accordance with the rules of
professional ethics, while continuing to act morally. The lawyer qua
lawyer is almost always acting as an agent for another, usually in an
undertaking that is critical to the client. When confronted with an issue
in which the rules of professional ethics conflict with the lawyer's
personal morality, the primary question is whose interest should
prevail-the lawyer's or the client's?
Most ethical dilemmas faced by practicing lawyers involve conflicts
between a lawyer's duty of zealous representation of a client, and the
duty of truthfulness and fairness to a party other than the client. The
extent of the problem is illustrated in the preamble to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct' (Model Rules), which states that "[v]irtually all
difficult ethical problems arise from the conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own
interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory
living." The problem is' especially pronounced in the area of tax
4. See id at 104-05 & n.16 ("The canonization of controversial ethical questions is a
usurpation of individual autonomy, and therefore insupportable."). The structure of the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which preceded the current Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, was particularly unfortunate because it contained separately delineated Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
(1997). Thus, the moral distance between the ethical considerations and the demands of the law was
lengthened.
5. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended, replaced the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, which included disciplinary rules under which a lawyer could be subject
to sanction by the state bar. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-101, 1-102
(1983). The Model Rules, on the other hand, contain legally enforceable sanctions under which a
lawyer can be punished by a court for substantive offenses such as legal malpractice. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (1997). For a discussion of the history of the ethical
standards of the legal profession and some limitations of these standards, see N. Lee Cooper &
Stephen F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and the Scope of Professionalism, 26
CUMB. L. REv. 923, 925-31 (1996).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr preamble (1997). For a criticism of this
statement, see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV.
639, 670-72 (1981). The term "legal system," as it is used in the preamble to the Model Rules,
[Vol. 47
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practice, in which various rules of ethics collide in force because of the
nature of the practice, which differs in two important respects from other
types of law practice.
First, tax practice is a multi-profession practice of lawyers and
nonlawyers, such as accountants and enrolled agents;7 hence, the need for
uniform standards of professional responsibility other than those of the
variously represented professional organizations. This need is met by
Circular 230,8 a set of Treasury Department regulations that specifically
governs practice before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and by the
civil penalty provisions of the Internal Revenue Code9 (the Code). In
addition, tax lawyers are subject to the ethics rules of the United States
Tax Court,'0 as well as the rules of professional ethics of the state bar
associations of the jurisdictions to which they are admitted to practice.
This Article maintains that the additional ethics rules to which tax
refers generally to the legal profession, encompassing the court system as well as the individual
members of the profession and the organized bar. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
preamble (1997).
A lawyer is both a professional, as a member of the legal profession, and a private citizen, as a
member of society. As an individual lawyer and officer of the legal system, the lawyer has a duty
not to engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct. See id. Rule 8.4. She must be candid with a
tribunal, and truthful and fair in dealing with others, including adversaries. See id. Rules 3.3, 3.4,
4.1. As a member of the bar, the lawyer should strive to strengthen legal education through support
of the Continuing Legal Education program, should engage in pro bono practice to provide legal
services to the poor, and should aid the bar in maintaining its independence through self-regulation.
See id. Rule 6.1. Thus, the lawyer should conform her conduct in accordance with the bar's ethical
rules and should report violations of these rules. See id Rule 8.3. As a member of society, the
lawyer owes a duty to society to conform to the requirements of the law, and to seek to improve the
law and the administration and quality of justice. See id. preamble.
7. Certified Public Accountants are automatically admitted to practice before the IRS. See 31
C.F.R. § 10.3(b) (1998). Other professionals may enroll to be admitted to practice, and, in some
cases, the IRS may permit enrollment to a limited extent See id. § 10.3(d), (e) (permitting enrolled
actuaries, those admitted temporarily while being considered for enrollment to practice, and those
acting pro se or representing a related party to practice). But see id § 10.3(), (g) (prohibiting
practice before the IRS by federal and state government officers and employees).
There has been considerable controversy over the issue of accountants, particularly the "Big Five"
accounting firms, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. See John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, 84
A.B.A. J. Feb. 1998, at 42, 42 (discussing accountants' encroachment in the legal market). In the
United States Tax Court, attorneys in good standing may be admitted to practice. See Tax Court
Rules of Practice, Rule 200(a)(2), 17 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 42,360 (1999). A taxpayer may
appear before the court pro se, and with the permission of the court, an officer of a corporation may
appear on behalf of the corporation. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.7. Other applicants must pass a written
examination. See id. §§ 10.3(e), 10.5(c).
8. 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.97.
9. See, e.g., 1.R.C. §§ 6694, 6701 (1994) (governing understatement penalty and aiding and
abetting understatements of tax liability).
10. The United States Tax Court has adopted the Model Rules. See Tax Court Rules of
Practice, Rule 201(a), 17 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 42,361 (1999).
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lawyers are subject create added ethical conflicts, and that the problems
likely to be encountered by tax lawyers have not been dissected
thoroughly enough for these conflicts to be meaningfully resolved.Second, tax practice differs from other types of law practice in that the
opposing party is always the government, which through its agency, the
IRS," assumes a variety of roles with respect to the lawyer. For instance,
it assumes a regulatory role both in promulgating and enforcing ethical
standards for those professionals practicing before it, and in processing
and examining returns of taxpayers. Moreover, it assumes a police role
in enforcing the revenue laws to ensure that taxpayers and their represen-
tatives conform not only to the requirements of the Internal Revenue
laws, but also to the government's own ethical standards. Finally, it
assumes a quasi-judicial role in issuing rulings in response to taxpayers'
requests for guidance in particular situations, in hearing taxpayer appeals
from assertions of deficiencies, and in deciding claims for refund. In all
of these roles, according to the American Bar Association (ABA), the
relationship between the IRS on the one hand, and the lawyer and client
on the other hand, is adversarial or potentially adversarial. 2 Thus, the
IRS is not considered a tribunal to which the lawyer would otherwise
owe a special duty of candor under the Model Rules.'3
Several commentators have noted, however, that, in addition to the
more specific duties to obey the Internal Revenue laws and regulations,
and to conform one's conduct to the government's ethical standards, tax
lawyers have a general duty to "protect the revenue,"4 "to contribute to
improvement of the tax laws and their administration,"" and ensure that
the tax system is "functioning honestly, fairly and smoothly."' 6 Thus,
lawyers advising clients in tax matters must balance the immediate
demands of their clients against "the public's interest in a sound tax
system which operates in accord with policy judgments reached through
a democratic process."' 7
11. The same applies, of course, to state tax practice in which the adversary is always the state
department of revenue and its agents.
12. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). See
infra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
13. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 3.3 (1997).
14. Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 1027,
104748 n.74 (1987).
15. Frederic G. Comeel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX LAW. 297, 301 (1990).
16. Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor-A Perspective, 40 TAXES 1030,
1032 (1962).
17. Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer's Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REv. 681, 693 (1997)
(reviewing JAMES P. HOLDEN & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE (1995)).
[Vol. 47
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When one considers the various roles of the government and the
various duties tax lawyers ostensibly owe to society, the government, the
legal profession in general, as well as the client in particular, the essential
question is what happens when these duties conflict? The purpose of this
Article is not to resolve this question definitively, but to place it in
perspective with the thesis that there is no discrete duty owed by the
lawyer qua lawyer either to society or to the tax system. Instead, as a
private citizen and a member of society, the lawyer has the same duty
that is imposed upon every person: to obey and uphold the law. As a
professional, the lawyer has a duty to behave as a moral, upstanding
person, adhering to the rules of professional responsibility while
representing the client to the best of her ability. Finally, as a member of
the legal profession, the lawyer has a duty to act in the best interests of
the profession as a whole.' If the lawyer adheres to these duties, there
should be no separate duty owed either to the tax system or to society.
In defining the duty owed by the lawyer, as a member of the legal
profession, to the government, this Article begins in Part II with the
pivotal issue of the relationship between the tax lawyer and the govern-
ment. It is this relationship that defines the lawyer's duty in her role as
a return preparer to disclose to the government return positions that do
not have a realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits, deter-
mined either administratively or judicially. Such disclosure is required
under both the civil penalty provisions of the Code and the ethics rules
of Circular 230." In contrast, under the Model Rules, no such duty of
disclosure is owed because of the ABA's position that the IRS is not a
tribunal, since the relationship between the taxpayer or attorney and the
IRS is considered adversarial.2 ' The ABA has been strongly criticized for
this position, 2' but this Article concludes that while the supporting
rationale of the ABA's position is flawed, it yields a feasible result.
18. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 8.1 (1997) (stating that a lawyer
must not knowingly make a false statement of material fact on application for admission to the bar
or in connection with a disciplinary matter), Rule 8.3 (stating that a lawyer should report professional
misconduct), Rule 8.4 (stating that a lawyer should not engage in misconduct).
19. See I.R.C. § 6694 (1994) (preparer understatement penalty); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (1998)
(standards with respect to the advising of return positions).
20. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965)
(discussing the ethical relationship between the IRS and the lawyers practicing before it); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (reconsidering Formal
Opinion 314), reprinted in 39 TAx LAw. 631 (1986).
21. See, e.g., Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA
Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAw 643, 647 (1986) (arguing that until audit, there is no
adversarial proceeding); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA.
TAX REV. 77, 95 (1989) ("That a lawyer may risk confrontation by advising an aggressive position
does not establish adversarial conditions.").
1999]
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The duty of disclosure raises several thorny problems for tax
practitioners. Chief among them is what happens if the lawyer deter-
mines that a position taken on a tax return lacks a realistic possibility of
success, and thus should be disclosed in accordance with the govern-
ment's rules and regulations, but the client refuses to disclose. This
Article also examines the lawyer's duty of disclosure when an IRS agent
makes a mistake in the client's favor. Does the lawyer's duty of candor
under Circular 230 and fairness to an opposing party under the Model
Rules trump the duty of confidentiality to the client, or vice versa?
Although this Article addresses ethical issues from the perspective of
the tax lawyer, the civil and criminal penalty provisions of the Code, as
well as the provisions of Circular 230, can apply to lawyers who do not
specialize in tax law, who never prepare returns for clients, and who have
few, if any, professional dealings with the IRS. This can happen in two
general ways: (1) a lawyer may be considered a return preparer under
the Code, even though the lawyer does not physically prepare a return,
if the lawyer or one of her employees renders advice for compensation
that constitutes a substantial portion of a return;22 and (2) a client can put
a lawyer at risk if the client has committed tax fraud and the lawyer's
advice might assist in furthering the fraud. Tax fraud raises a number of
problems for the lawyer which this Article examines in the latter section
of Part II.
Parts III and IV examine the antithesis of the duty of disclosure--the
duty of confidentiality. In Part III, the Article focuses on practitioner
privilege-both the attorney-client privilege and the newly enacted
accountant-client or tax advisor privilege. Part IV discusses the
government's duty not to disclose return information and problems that
have arisen from the government's interpretation of that duty.
22. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (1994). For a definition of substantiality, see Treas. Reg. §
301.7701-15(b) (as amended in 1980). Only one individual per firm is treated as a preparer. See
id. 1.6694-1(b). That person is usually the signing preparer-the person who signs the return or
refund claim as the preparer. If no one in the firm signed as the preparer, one individual will be
liable, nonetheless, as a nonsigning preparer. See id. This is usually the individual with "overall
supervisory responsibility for the advice given." Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(b) (as amended in 1992).
Because liability is limited to one person per firm, the person who is liable may not rely on the
advice of another person in the same firm in order to establish a reasonable cause and good faith
defense. See id. § 1.6994-2(a)(2). Thus, the defense is not available to those who rely on the advice
of another member of the same firm. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3 (1991).
[Vol. 47
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II. THE NATURE OF THE ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TAx
LAWYER AND THE GOVERNMENT
A. The View of the ABA
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer has a duty to disclose to a tribunal
adverse controlling authority that has not been disclosed by the opposing
party.23 Thus, the lawyer has an ethical duty to disclose weaknesses in
the client's case to a tribunal if the opposing party does not do so. With
respect to third parties, the lawyer has a duty to be fair and truthful, and
to refrain from assisting a client's crime or fraud, but otherwise there
is no duty of disclosure under the Model Rules. In fact, the lawyer owes
the client a duty of confidentiality and cannot disclose weaknesses to
third parties without the client's approval."
The ABA has stated in two formal opinions that the IRS is considered
neither a "true tribunal" nor a "quasi-judicial institution" because of its
lack of impartiality.26 Instead, the IRS is considered an adversary to
whom the lawyer owes no greater duty than is owed to any other
adversarial party. The first formal opinion, issued in 1965, disposes of
the issue somewhat glibly with the rationale that the IRS, while "obvious-
ly intending to be fair, . . . is not designed and does not purport to be
unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial sense."27  Twenty years later,
the ABA concluded in the second formal opinion that lawyers have no
obligation to disclose an aggressive return position to the IRS because the
filing of such a return could realistically be regarded as the "first step in
a process that may result in an adversary relationship between the client
and the IRS. '"2
Critics have argued forcefully that the ABA's position is wrong
because it fails to consider the various roles of a tax lawyer, the three
most general being advisor, advocate, and return preparer.29 In the roles
of advisor and return preparer, very little of the tax lawyer's practice
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1997).
24. See id. Rule 4.1.
25. See id. Rule 1.6. According to the ABA commentary on Model Rule 1.6, "[t]he observance
of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate confidential information of the client not only
facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages people to seek early legal assistance." Id. cmt. 2.
26. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
27. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
28. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
29. See Falk, supra note 21, at 645-46 (discussing the various roles of tax lawyers). Note that
Falk delineates several types of advisors: return advisor, tax planning advisor, and tax shelter
advisor. See id. In fact, the roles of advisor and return preparer may overlap because the lawyer
may advise a client on a return position. See id.
1999]
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involves adversarial interaction with the government. In fact, there may
be very little direct interaction with the government at all.30 This is what
was intended under the voluntary compliance system of federal taxation.3'
Indeed, the purpose of a return is to fulfill the taxpayer's legal obligation
of disclosure, reporting, and self-assessment. 2 Because relatively few
returns are audited,33 the filing of a return cannot realistically be regarded
as the first step in an adversarial proceeding. 4  Even the ABA has
admitted informally that until the taxpayer is audited, there is no
30. See id at 657 ("Much federal tax practice does not involve appearances before the
Service.").
31. See id. at 647.
32. See id at 647-48 (discussing criticism of the ABA Tax Section's position that the filing of
a return is the start of an adversarial process). Perhaps, in response to this criticism, the ABA
appointed a special task force that issued a report interpreting Formal Opinion 85-352. This report
attempted to soften the ABA's position:
The Opinion does not state that the general ethical guidelines governing advocacy in
litigation are determinative, or suggest that tax returns are adversarial proceedings. To
the contrary, a tax return initially serves a disclosure, reporting, and self-assessment
function. It is the citizen's report to the government of his or her relevant activities for
the year. The Opinion says that because some returns, particularly aggressive ones, may
result in an adversary relationship, there is a place for consideration of the ethical
considerations regarding advocacy. Thus, the Opinion blends the ethical guidelines
governing advocacy with those applicable to advising, from which the new ethical
standard is derived.
Paul J. Sax et a., Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAx LAw. 635,
640 (1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. But see Durst, supra note 14, at 1046 (finding Formal
Opinion 85-352 and the Task Force Report unconvincing).
33. The chances of being audited by the IRS continue to decline. In 1995 and 1996, only
1.67% of individual income tax returns were audited. See Tom Herman, A Special Summary and
Forecast of Federal and State Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1998, at Al. In 1997, the
percentage declined to 1.27%. See id For the 1998 fiscal year (ending September 30, 1998), the
projected percentage was 1.09%. See id It should be noted, however, that the I to 1.6% audit rate
translates into around 1.9 million returns. See MARTIN KAPLAN & NAOMI WEISS, WHAT THE IRS
DOES NOT WANT YOU TO KNOW 47 (5th ed. 1999). When the number of audited returns is
considered, the audit risk becomes more daunting.
In recently enacted legislation, Congress shifted the burden of proof to the IRS in civil court
proceedings. See I.R.C. § 7491 (West Supp. 1999). One commentator postulates that there will be
even fewer audits as a result of this legislation because the shift in the burden of proof probably will
mean "more intrusive audits, increased use of the summons power, and more expansive discovery
in litigation." Leandra Lederman, Unforeseen Consequences of the Burden of Proof Shift, 80 TAX
NoTs 379, 382 (1998).
34. See Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax Audit
Lottery, I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 411, 414 n.29 (1987) (discussing the position of the ABA's Tax
Section that the filing of a tax return should not be regarded as the start of an adversarial proceeding
because (1) so few returns are audited that, in general, returns are rarely "subjected to adversarial
review," and (2) it is merely the taxpayer's report to the government of financial transactions for that
period, and regarding it as anything else undermines the self-assessment system).
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adversarial relationship." But even if the client is audited, the relation-
ship between the client (and, by extension, the lawyer) and the IRS is not
necessarily adversarial, because the revenue agent is obligated to deal
fairly with the taxpayer. It is only in the event that the IRS and the
taxpayer disagree over a return position, or if the IRS suspects fraud, or
if the revenue agent violates the IRS audit standards that the relationship
becomes adversarial. 6 Thus, it cannot be said that the nature of the
relationship between the lawyer and the government is always adversarial;
neither can it be said realistically that the relationship is generally
adversarial. In fact, in comparatively few cases is there an adversarial
relationship between the taxpayer (or his lawyer) and the IRS. Thus, the
governing ethical standard should not be determined by the unusual case.
Critics further argue that the ABA's position encourages the playing of
the audit lottery, undermines the voluntary compliance system, and is thus
detrimental both to society and to the legal profession." Most of these
critics also admit that the lawyer's duties are derivative of the client's
duties,38 and that the lawyer should not inject extraneous moralism into
tax advice.39 Yet, tax law is extremely complex and subject to frequent
change. There may be times when the resolution of a particular issue is
not crystal clear and the lawyer may be called upon to make a decision
that will involve an exercise of her independent judgment. Should the
lawyer be required to disclose to the government weaknesses in her
client's position? Or does the duty of confidentiality control?
Critics aside, if we assume for the moment that the ABA had
concluded that the IRS was not an adversarial party, and that it was a
tribunal to which the special duty of disclosure applied, this would have
created several problems for lawyers engaged in tax practice. First, as
the ABA notes, the government does have a stake in the outcome of the
35. See Falk, supra note 21, at 644 n.4, 647 n.14 (discussing a proposed revision to Formal
Opinion 314); see also Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 640 (reporting that the ABA Task Force
backed away from the adversarial position). But see Steven C. Todrys, NYSBA Opposes Burden of
Proof Shift, 79 TAX NOTEs 125, 125 (1998) (stating that the result of the burden of proof shift under
I.R.C. § 7491 is likely to be "more intrusive IRS audit procedures," which will introduce an
adversarial tone, or heighten the existing adversarial nature of the audit process "if the IRS concludes
that numerous interviews of potential third-party witnesses are necessary to develop its affirmative
case in the event of litigation").
36. See Falk, supra note 21, at 647 & n.16.
37. See id. at 647-49; Handelman, supra note 21, at 93-94.
38. See Handelman, supra note 21, at 89 ("While the legal expertise provided may expand the
client's awareness of opportunities and constraints, the taxpayer's rights and duties are neither
expanded nor contracted by retaining a lawyer."); James P. Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return
Advice: A Commentary, 9 VA. TAX REV. 771, 772-73 (1990) (agreeing on this issue and replying
in general to Professor Handelman).
39. See Falk, supra note 21, at 645, 660-62.
1999]
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 855 1998-1999
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
controversy, and therefore is not as impartial as a judge would be.4'
Second, occasions clearly arise in which the lawyer and the government
are adversaries, such as in a court proceeding. There are other occasions,
however, in which it may be difficult to determine whether the taxpayer
or his lawyer-representative and the IRS are adversaries. For example,
it may not always be clear at the outset whether an audit is routine, or
whether it constitutes the beginning of a criminal investigation, which
would herald the advent of an adversarial relationship between the
taxpayer and his lawyer on the one side and the government on the other
side. If the duty of disclosure is applied broadly, it would be difficult to
effectively advise and represent a client who has committed tax fraud.4,
At the very least, it would drive a wedge between the lawyer and her
client if the lawyer is obligated to disclose the fraud to the government.
Third, because tax practice is a mixed-profession practice, it would mean
that lawyers would be held to a higher ethical standard than other tax
practitioners who are not subject to an additional disclosure requirement.42
Fourth, while the government may not be the formidable opponent it
might at first blush appear to be43 (for instance, it is a well-known fact
that the government lacks the resources to audit more than a small
percentage of returns), nevertheless, it is not a helpless opponent either.
The government brings considerable pressure to bear in influencing
legislation when it perceives weaknesses in the laws, and the government
uses these laws, as well as its own ethics rules, to ensure that tax
practitioners conform to a standard of conduct that it finds acceptable.44
For example, in order to reduce the odds in favor of the taxpayer in the
audit lottery, the Code requires both taxpayers and their return preparers
to disclose aggressive return positions if these positions are not supported
40. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
41. But see infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text (discussing duty of lawyer to be truthful
in dealings with the government).
42. Although the Model Rules are merely a guide and thus do not control the conduct of
practicing lawyers, they have been adopted in some form by most states, and they have been adopted
in their entirety by the United States Tax Court. See Tax Court Rules of Procedure, Rule 201(a),
17 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 42,361 (1999).
43. Indeed, the IRS has been referred to as a "paper tiger, not a leviathan the taxpayer should
defeat by cunning." Falk, supra note 21, at 648.
44. So effective is the government in regulating the professional conduct of tax practitioners
that no state bar association has ever disciplined a practitioner or even expressed concern over the
conduct of a tax practitioner related to the quality of tax advice. See James P. Holden, Practitio-
ners' Standard of Practice and the Taxpayer's Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 327, 337
(1991).
[Vol. 47
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 856 1998-1999
TAX LAWYERS AND ETHICS
by substantial authority and lack a realistic possibility of success.4s If the
position results in a substantial understatement of tax liability and the
taxpayer fails to disclose the position, the IRS can impose a monetary
penalty on both the taxpayer and the preparer. 6 Return preparers may be
subject to further disciplinary sanctions under Circular 230."' These
penalties and their potential effects are discussed in Part III below.
The preparers' understatement penalty raises a further potential
problem if the ABA had concluded that a special disclosure duty was
owed to the IRS: what weight should a state bar ethics committee give
to an IRS conclusion that a lawyer is subject to the preparer penalty?
Would the IRS determination and sanction alone subject the lawyer to
discipline by the state ethics committee without further investigation? If
so, the lawyer could be penalized for conduct that otherwise may not
constitute an ethics violation in that particular jurisdiction;48 thus, there
would be an ethics violation without fault. If not, and the investigation
of the state bar ethics committee concludes that the lawyer did not violate
the ethical duty to disclose, the civil preparer penalty would be under-
mined.
Thus, the position of the ABA, though flawed in its reasoning,
perhaps represents a tacit acknowledgment of the problems that would
have been raised had the ABA endorsed the government's disclosure
requirement. If so, it is unfortunate that it was not more explicit in its
reasoning. Instead, as critics have noted, the ABA appears to have
45. See I.R.C. §§ 6662 (taxpayer's penalty), 6694 (preparer's penalty) (1994). Section 6662
imposes a 20% penalty on any underpayment of tax liability to which the provision applies. See
I.R.C. § 6662. The amount of this penalty is reduced by that portion of the understatement for which
the taxpayer can demonstrate either substantial authority (defined under the regulations) or a
reasonable basis for the position, provided that the position is adequately disclosed to the IRS. See
id. § 6662(a), (d)(2).
46. The taxpayer's penalty is 20% of the underpayment (40% in the case of gross valuation
overstatements). See id. § 6662(a), (h)(l). The penalty applies to returns that contain a substantial
understatement of income tax. See id § 6662(b)(2). A substantial understatement is defined as the
greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return, or $5000. See id. § 6662(d)(1). An
understatement is defined as the excess of the amount of tax required to be shown on the return over
the amount shown on the return, reduced by (1) the amount of any rebates and (2) the amount of the
understatement for which there is either substantial authority or a reasonable basis for the tax treat-
ment, provided that the position was adequately disclosed. See id. § 6662(d)(2).
The preparer's penalty is $250 per return or claim, and $1000 for a reckless or intentional
disregard of the rules and regulations. See I.R.C. § 6694(a), (b). This amount is reduced by the
portion of the understatement for which there is a realistic possibility of being sustained on the
merits, or where the preparer can demonstrate reasonable cause for the understatement and that she
acted in good faith. See id.
47. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(j) (1998) (describing disreputable conduct for which the practitioner
may be disbarred or suspended from practice).
48. See Holden, supra note 44, at 37 (stating that no jurisdiction has penalized conduct or
expressed concern in connection with the rendering of tax advice).
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condoned playing the audit lottery, thereby sending the wrong message
to the public in general and to the legal profession in particular.49
B. The View of the Government
1. Return Preparers and the Duty to Disclose
ABA Formal Opinion 85-35250 applies to lawyers who prepare tax
returns or render advice with respect to return positions." These lawyers,
however, are subject to the provisions of Circular 230, as well as the civil
penalty provisions of the Code,52 both of which conflict with the Formal
Opinion on the issue of disclosure of aggressive return positions.
The Opinion permits a lawyer to recommend, without disclosure, return
positions for which there is no substantial authority in support of the
position, even if the lawyer believes the position probably will not
prevail.53 The position cannot be frivolous, though, and the lawyer must
have a good faith belief that the position is "warranted in existing law or
can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
49. See Handelman, supra note 21, at 95-96 (noting that failure to disclose an aggressive return
position constitutes deception). As another commentator has stated: "By drawing from litigation
standards, [Formal] Opinion 85-352 indicates to practitioners that a taxpayer's desire to test the
bounds of what is legally permissible is of greater significance than the taxpayer's duty to file a true
and correct return." Myron C. Grauer, What's Wrong With This Picture?: The Tension Between
Analytical Premises and Appropriate Standards For Tax Practitioners, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 353, 363
(1991).
50. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
51. According to the Task Force Report, the scope of Formal Opinion 85-352 is to
restate the lawyer's duty in advising a client as to positions that can be taken on a tax
return. The same principles should apply to all aspects of tax practice to the extent tax
return positions would be involved. For example, it should govern the lawyer's duty as
to tax advice in the course of structuring transactions that will involve tax return positions,
including tax advice in the course of preparing legal documents such as employee benefit
trusts, wills, and business buy-sell agreements. However, Opinion 85-352 does not
address a lawyer's duty and responsibilities in negotiation and settlement procedures with
the Internal Revenue Service, which are the subject of discussion in Opinion 314, and
which continue to be governed by Opinion 314. Nor does Opinion 85-352 address the
lawyer's duties and responsibilities in tax litigation.
Task Force Report, supra note 32, at 636.
52. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 6695(a) (failure to furnish copy of return to taxpayer), 6695(b) (failure
to sign return), 6695(c) (failure to show identification numbers), 6700 (promoting abusive tax
shelters) (1994). According to two commentators, "the taxpayer and the IRS will remain opponents
in an adversary proceeding in which penalties mark the borderlines of acceptable taxpayer and tax
practitioner behavior." William L. Raby & Burgess J.W. Raby, Facts Can Control in 'Substantial
Authority' Cases, 80 TAX NOTES 1465, 1467 (1998).
53. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
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or reversal of existing law." 4 The Opinion also requires some "realistic
possibility of success if the matter is litigated.""
Circular 230 prohibits a tax practitioner from signing a return or
giving advice on a return position that "does not have a realistic
possibility of being sustained on its merits ... unless the position is not
frivolous and is adequately disclosed to the Service.""6  The Code
contains a corresponding provision under which a civil penalty may be
imposed on a return preparer who understates tax liability by recommend-
ing a return position that does not have a "realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits. 57
Violations of the Circular 230 provision that are attributable to
willfulness, recklessness, or gross incompetence will subject the
practitioner to "suspension or disbarment from practice before the
Service."58 Infractions of the Code will result in a monetary penalty of
$250 per return,59 increasing to $1000 per return for willful, reckless, or
intentional understatements.6" While the amount of the nonwillful,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (1998) (emphasis added).
57. I.RIC. § 6694(a) (1994). An understatement is defined as "any understatement of the net
amount payable with respect to any tax imposed . . . or any overstatement of the net amount
creditable or refundable with respect to any such tax." Id. § 6694(e). This provision is intended to
encompass negligent understatements that had previously been subject to penalty under I.R.C. § 6694.
See H.K. 101-239, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Note also that the understatement against which
the penalty applies is not reduced by the amount of any carryback. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(c)
(1992).
58. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b).
59. See I.R.C. § 6694(a); see also supra note 46 (discussing monetary penalties).
60. See I.R.C. § 6694(b). Under prior law, it was determined that a taxpayer could be liable
for both the section 6694(a) and the section 6694(b) penalty concurrently if the government met its
burden of proof with respect to both provisions. See Judisch v. U.S., 755 F.2d 823, 827-28 (11 th
Cir. 1985). Under current law, both penalties may apply, but if so, the section 6694(b) penalty is
reduced by the amount of any section 6694(a) penalty imposed. See I.R.C. § 6694(b); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6694-3(g) (1991).
Note that in a situation in which a new statute directly conflicts with a specific statement in the
committee reports, a position in accordance with either the statute or the committee report would
satisfy the realistic possibility of success standard, and thus the preparer would be absolved of a
section 6694(a) penalty. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3 (1991) (stating that such a position constitutes
a disregard of a rule or regulation and must be disclosed in order to avoid the penalty). If the
position is contrary to the statute, though, the position would subject the preparer to a section 6694(b)
penalty unless it were adequately disclosed. See id.
In order to avoid section 6694(b) penalty, a preparer must prove (1) that no rule or regulation was
recklessly or intentionally disregarded, (2) that any position contrary to a regulation represented a
good faith challenge to the validity of the regulation, and (3) that disclosure was adequately made.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(0 (1991). However, a revenue ruling or other IRS announcement does
not constitute a rule within the statutory sense, nor does it constitute a regulation, which is
promulgated by the Treasury Department under the authority of Congress and thus has the cloak of
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nonreckless understatement penalty may seem minor to those who are not
representing clients pro bono, the problem is the correlation between the
civil penalty and Circular 230. A preparer cannot afford very many of
these civil penalties, even if they are the more minor variety, because that
may establish a pattern of misconduct that, in turn, may attract the
attention of the IRS Director of Practice.6 This could result in the
imposition of more serious sanctions under Circular 230.2
In order to be subject to the preparer penalty, the preparer must have
known, or reasonably should have known, of the position being taken on
the return.63 The definition of the term "realistic possibility" under both
the Code and Circular 230 is consistent with the ABA definition: a one-
in-three or greater chance of success on the merits, as determined by the
reasonable and well-informed analysis of a person knowledgeable in the
law. A revenue ruling merely represents the IRS viewpoint and has no other elevated status.
A preparer is not considered to have acted recklessly or intentionally if there is a realistic
possibility of success for the position taken. But when the return position is contrary to a regulation,
the position must be taken in good faith and must be disclosed, regardless of whether it has a realistic
possibility of success. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(d) (1991) (stating that no disclosure required for
challenge of a revenue ruling but disclosure is required for the challenge of a regulation.)
61. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.510). Note that this provision has been criticized on the ground that
it is poor policy to impose a standard of professional responsibility in an area that should be left to
the civil penalty provisions governing return preparers under the Code. See Handelman, supra note
21, at 84 n.43. The rationale behind the criticism is that the considerations between professional
ethics and civil penalties are different. See id.
62. Compare 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b) ("Only violations ... that are willful, reckless, or a result
of gross incompetence will subject a practitioner to suspension or disbarment from practice before
the Service."), with 31 C.F.R. § 10.5 10) ("A pattern of conduct is a factor that will be taken into
account in determining whether a practitioner acted knowingly, recklessly, or through gross
incompetence."). Although Congress evidently intended the IRS to use its discretion and not refer
these cases automatically to the Director of Practice, see H.R. 101-239, 101 st Cong., 1 st Sess. (1989),
this does not appear to be the current policy of the IRS. See BERNARD WOLFMAN E" AL., ETHICAL
PROB3LEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 53 (1995) (citing IRS Administration Manual).
63. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(2) (1994).
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tax law.' Under both the Code and Circular 230, the taxpayer's chances
in the audit lottery may not be considered in this determination.65
Both the civil penalty and the Circular 230 sanction may be avoided
if the position is not frivolous (defined as "patently improper")," and is
adequately disclosed on the return or claim.67 Thus a preparer may
advise a position that does not have a realistic possibility of success if the
position is not frivolous and it is adequately disclosed." Adequate
disclosure means that the return or claim must be sufficient to alert the
IRS to the position being taken.69 Thus, the position must be disclosed
either on a Form 8275 (Disclosure Statement) attached to the return or on
the return itself in accordance with the applicable forms and instruc-
tions.70
64. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1991); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(4)(i); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985). In determining
whether a position has a realistic possibility of success, the analysis and authorities considered in
determining substantial authority under the taxpayer accuracy-related penalty (section 6662) may also
be considered for purposes of the preparer penalty. See infra notes 85-113 and accompanying text.
The preparer may not rely, however, on some types of authority regularly relied upon by
practitioners, such as tax treatises, legal opinions, legal periodicals, or opinions of other tax
professionals. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991). This means that the preparer may not
advise a position that advocates a modification or reversal of existing law without disclosure because
the position must be analyzed under the substantial authority standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-
2(b)(l) (as amended in 1991) (containing preparer penalty provision which refers to the substantial
authority standard); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (1991) (delineating the substantial authority
standard). Thus, the weight of authority supporting the treatment must be objectively substantial in
relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary treatment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1);
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3) (1991); see also Gwen T. Handelman, Caring Reasonably, 20 CAP. U.
L. REv. 345, 351 n.29 (1991) (discussing this point).
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1991); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(4)(i). But
the chances of audit may be considered in advising a client of the duty to disclose an aggressive
return position. See Holden, supra note 44, at 776 (replying to Professor Handelman).
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1), (2) (as amended in 1991); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(4)(ii).
This definition also must be read in conjunction with the Model Rules, which provide that for a
position to be nonfrivolous, there must be at least a "good faith argument for an extension,
modification or a reversal of existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1
(1997).
67. See I.R.C. § 6694(a); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1).
68. See I.R.C. § 6694(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1991).
69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(1).
70. The type of disclosure required varies according to the status of the preparer and the type
of penalty being imposed. If the individual is a signing preparer, the disclosure must be made on
a Form 8275 Disclosure Statement (or an 8275-R if the position is contrary to a regulation) or on
the return itself in accordance with IRS specifications. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3) (as amended
in 1991); see also Rev. Proc. 97-56, 1997-52 I.R.B. 18 (stating that the disclosure on the return must
be made in accordance with all applicable forms and instructions and the monetary amounts must be
verifiable). If the position being asserted is contrary to a rule or regulation, so that the penalty under
section 6694(b) might apply, disclosure must be made on a disclosure statement (Form 8275 or 8275-
R) attached to the return. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e) (1991). In addition, the disclosure must be
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The imposition of the preparer penalty does not necessarily involve the
physical filing of a return or refund claim, nor does it necessarily require
the individual to sign the return or claim as a preparer. If an individual
renders advice for compensation that constitutes a substantial portion of
a return or claim for refund, that individual may be considered a return
preparer under the Code and the corresponding regulations."
An attorney is deemed a return preparer if the attorney furnishes
sufficient advice on a specific issue to either the taxpayer or to another
preparer, so that completion of the return is "largely a mechanical or
clerical matter."72 The information or advice must be directly relevant to
the determination of the existence, characterization, or amount of an entry
on a return or refund claim,73 and it must relate to a completed, as
opposed to a contemplated, transaction. For example, if an attorney
advises a partnership on the deductibility of expenses, and the attorney
prepares the partnership information return to the IRS, as well as the K-
1 's to the partners in accordance with the advice given, the attorney may
unwittingly be considered a return preparer, not only with respect to the
partnership but also with respect to the partners.75 Thus, lawyers who
specific as to which rule or regulation it is opposing, and the opposition must be made in good faith.
See id.
A nonsigning preparer may render advice to the taxpayer, or to another preparer, or to both. The
nonsigning preparer's disclosure obligation is met with respect to the taxpayer if the preparer advises
the taxpayer that the position lacks substantial authority and that the taxpayer may be subject to the
substantial understatement penalty if the position is not disclosed. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(ii)
(as amended in 1991). If the nonsigning preparer is required to render advice with respect to the
position in writing, the disclosure advice also must be in writing. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-3(e)
(1991). Apparently, parole evidence will not suffice in this instance and the written advice may be
used against the preparer if the preparer neglects her duty. See id. If the advice with respect to the
position is oral, the disclosure advice also may be oral, but the preparer should make contemporane-
ous documentation to support the fact that the disclosure advice was given. See id.
If the advice with respect to the position is given to another preparer, the disclosure obligation of
the nonsigning preparer is met if there is a statement from the nonsigning preparer that disclosure
is required. See id. If the advice is required to be in writing, the statement also must be in writing.
See id. If the advice is oral, the statement also may be oral but contemporaneous notes should be
made to document the advice. See id.
71. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36) (1994) (defining the term "preparer"); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
15(a) (as amended in 1980).
72. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) (as amended in 1980). The advice must constitute all or
a substantial portion of the return or refund claim. Substantiality is defined as length, complexity,
amount of tax liability or refund involved in that portion of the return compared to the return as a
whole. See id. § 301.7701-15(b)(1).
73. See id. § 301.7701-15(b)(1).
74. See id. § 301.7701-15(a)(2)(i).
75. See Goulding v. United States, 957 F.2d 1420, 1428 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that payment
by partnership was imputed to partners through their capital contributions). Note also that firms that
prepare and sell computer programs to tax practitioners or to taxpayers may be considered return
preparers if the program goes beyond mere mechanical assistance. See Rev. Rul. 85-187, 1985-2
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render tax opinions are susceptible to the preparer penalty for substantial
understatement of tax liability if the opinions pertain to matters likely to
constitute a substantial portion of a tax return.
The realistic possibility standard also raises several'problems for return
preparers. First, while some standards are easy to quantify, this one is
not. For instance, can one feasibly differentiate between a 10% and a
33.33% chance of success, or between a one-in-three and a one-in-four
chance of success? Also, what is the measure of success? 6  The
government's predictive standard of requiring a preparer to guess what
a court would do has been soundly criticized for exposing the preparer
to a potentially serious sanction for what could be a lawful position,
albeit one that might lack a realistic possibility of success.77
Moreover, what constitutes success in litigation? It could take years
before the conclusion of the appellate process. Although the understate-
ment penalty may be imposed regardless of whether a final appeal has
been concluded, and should be abated if the preparer ultimately prevails,78
nevertheless, in the meantime the imposition of the penalty could make
the preparer overly risk averse. Also, in determining the possibility of
success, the fact that the highest court has rendered a decision contrary
to the position taken on the return is not necessarily conclusive of a lack
of a realistic possibility of success because even the United States
Supreme Court may subsequently reverse itself.79 Thus, the ABA has
taken the view that the realistic possibility of success standard does not
mean that the lawyer must necessarily believe that the position will
prevail. °  Although this view has been criticized,' it is, nonetheless,
C.B. 338 (stating that preparer liability may be imposed for .computerized tax return preparation
service for practitioners); Rev. Rul. 85-189, 1985-2 C.B. 339 (describing similar result with respect
to computerized programs for taxpayers).
76. See Osteen v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 356, 359 (1Ith Cir. 1995) (addressing the taxpayer's
substantial authority standard, with the Eleventh Circuit noting that substantial authority exists if a
lower court could have decided in favor of the taxpayer, whether or not it actually did, and that an
appellate court could have affirmed the decision as not clearly erroneous).
77. See Falk, supra note 21, at 655 ("Whether one can in good faith believe in the lawfulness
of a position is not the same as predicting that the courts will adopt it."); Handelman, supra note 21,
at 97 n.95 (noting that this standard also fails to take into account extraneous issues that could
influence a judicial decision, such as lack of expertise and hostility to the IRS).
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1(d) (as amended in 1991) ("If it is established at any time in a
final administrative determination or a final judicial decision that there was no understatement of
liability ... then the assessment must be abated and ... the amount of any penalty ... must be
refunded ... without regard to any period of limitations.").
79. See Falk, supra note 21, at 655 n.52 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court reversal of 1943 West
Virginia decision initially holding that law requiring students to salute the flag was constitutional).
80. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985)
(discussing reporting positions).
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consistent with the one-in-three standard as defined in the regulations.
If a position has a one-in-three chance of success, by definition it can
have a less than 50 percent chance of success. But the fact that the
minimum standard could support a position that has a less than 50 percent
chance of success should not be an argument in favor of either the
routine application of the minimum standard or its being used to support
positions that otherwise have no realistic possibility of success at all.
Instead, the flexibility of the standard should be used-as it was
intended-to advance positions that the lawyer believes "can be supported
by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law." 2
A second problem lies with the amnesty disclosure provision because
the taxpayer is permitted to litigate questionable positions in the United
States Tax Court prior to payment of the tax liability. While this does
not mean that the taxpayer is entitled to play the audit lottery in
advancing any colorable claim without some disclosure, the type of
disclosure required by the government could constitute an admission
against the interest of the client because the purpose of the disclosure is
to notify the government that, in the preparer's opinion, the position does
not have a realistic possibility of success.8 3 This could prejudice the
client in any subsequent litigation on the merits of the position. 4
2. The Taxpayer's Accuracy-Related Understatement Penalty
Another problem raised by the issue of disclosure is that a comparable
understatement penalty applies to the taxpayer-client,"' and the interrela-
tionship of that penalty and the preparer penalty may create a conflict of
interest between the preparer and her client. The primary problem lies
with the standard of disclosure, which niay vary between the two
penalties.
The taxpayer has three opportunities to avoid the understatement
penalty. These opportunities correspond roughly to the preparer's
avoidance opportunities. First, the penalty does not apply to taxpayer
positions for which there is "substantial authority," 6 as defined under the
81. See Handelman, supra note 21, at 95 (stating that the ABA position "condones deception"
and "violates the lawyer's duty of candor").
82. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
83. See Handelman, supra note 21, at 98 (arguing that disclosure, in this context, would amount
to "a virtual concession on the merits").
84. See id.
85. See I.R.C. § 6662 (1994) (accuracy-related, substantial understatement penalty). Note that
the IRS has the burden of proving the liability of an individual taxpayer for the penalty and any
additions to tax. See I.RIC. § 7491(c) (West Supp. 1998).
86. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(BXi) (1994).
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regulations.87 In general, the substantial authority standard corresponds
to the preparer's realistic possibility standard.88 Because recent cases
define substantial authority to include substantial factual evidence,
however, such evidence may enable a taxpayer to avoid the substantial
understatement penalty even though this evidence alone would not be
substantial enough to enable the taxpayer to succeed on the merits.8 9
Thus, a taxpayer relying solely on factual evidence may not prevail on
the merits, but otherwise may satisfy the substantial authority standard,
thereby avoiding the understatement penalty. Because the preparer's
standard is based on the success of the merits of the position, there may
be a gap between the preparer's standard and the taxpayer's standad.90
Second, the penalty does not apply if the taxpayer has a reasonable
basis for the position and there is adequate disclosure.9 As a general
rule, the lawyer's duty and the client's duty will be compatible because
the lawyer and the client will share a common goal-the avoidance of the
understatement penalty. A problem arises, however, when the practitio-
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991) (discussing substantial authority standard); see also
Raby & Raby, supra note 52, at 1465 (stating that evidentiary authority that is substantial relative
to contrary evidence may be sufficient to avoid a substantial understatement penalty, even though
such evidence is not sufficient to support the substantive issue that gave rise to the understatement).
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(4)(as amended in 1991); see also Deborah H. Schenk,
Conflicts Between the Tax Lawyer and the Client: Vignettes in the Law Office, 20 CAP. U. L. REV.
387, 405 n.68 (1991) (stating that it is unlikely that there were would be substantial authority if the
lawyer thought there was not a realistic possibility of success on the merits, and that about the only
way this could occur is when there is a difference of opinion between the lawyer and the client as
to whether there is substantial authority).
89. See Kluener v. Commissioner, 154 F.3d 630, 638-39 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that authority
includes factual as well as legal authority); Streber v. Commissioner, 138 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir.
1998) (stating that the substantial understatement penalty may be avoided by factual evidence that
is substantial); see also Osteen v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d 356, 359 (1I1th Cir. 1995) ("Only if there
was a record upon which the Government could obtain a reversal under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard could it be argued that from an evidentiary standpoint, there was not substantial authority for
the taxpayer's position.").
90. This view is apparently not shared by William and Burgess Raby, who note in their recent
article that "[als a result of these cases there will be more situations than before when practitioners
can in good conscience answer 'no' to the checklist query about whether it will be necessary to file
a Form 8275 with the return." Raby & Raby, supra note 52, at 1468. The two standards, however,
are different because the practitioner standard is based on a "realistic possibility of being sustained
on the merits," whereas the taxpayer's standard, as interpreted by the recent cases, does not look to
the merits of the substantive case, but merely to whether or not there is substantial authority sufficient
to avoid the understatement penalty. Kluener, 154 F.3d at 637. Thus, an appellate court may review
de novo a trial court's evaluation of the law and application of that law to the relevant facts. See id.
91. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). An exception applies to tax shelters, for which there
is a higher standard. If a position with respect to a tax shelter lacks substantial authority, the
understatement penalty applies regardless of disclosure. See id. § 6662(d)(2)(C). Moreover, even
if the position has substantial authority, the taxpayer must have reasonably believed that the position
was more likely than not proper. See id.
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ner determines that disclosure is in her best interest but the client does
not wish to disclose. This creates a clear conflict of interest in which the
lawyer may no longer be able to represent her client competently.92
If disclosure is not in the client's best interest, the client-taxpayer
may be disadvantaged by seeking the advice of a professional. If the
taxpayer would not otherwise have had to disclose the position because
it satisfies the reasonable basis standard, and the taxpayer chooses not to
disclose contrary to the advice of the attorney-advisor, the taxpayer will
no longer have a reasonable cause and good faith defense to the
understatement penalty because the failure to disclose will be contrary to
the advice of the advisor. Moreover, if the taxpayer chooses to litigate
the merits of the position in the United States Tax Court and the
attorney's opinion that the decision lacked a realistic possibility of
success prejudices the taxpayer's case, this in itself could constitute a
violation of the Model Rule against conflicts of interest."
In practice, it is seldom feasible to render an opinion stating that a
position has a one-in-three, as opposed to a one-in-four, chance of
success.94 In between the sure losers (no reasonable basis) and the sure
winners, there is a vast gray area of uncertainty. If the lawyer thinks the
undisclosed position falls short of the one-in-three standard but above the
reasonable basis standard, can the client feasibly expect unbiased advice
from his lawyer? Does the use of a professional preparer, whether a
lawyer, accountant, or commercial tax preparation service, automatically
subject the client-taxpayer to the higher standard?
Because it is often difficult to determine with any degree of certainty
whether the realistic possibility standard has been met, adequate
disclosure provides a safe harbor for both the preparer and the taxpayer
to avoid the understatement penalty. Thus, even if a preparer thinks the
return position is reasonable, she may favor disclosure nonetheless to
avoid the understatement penalty. Furthermore, if a preparer has
previously been subject to an understatement penalty, she might now be
"gun-shy" or overly risk averse and thus inclined to urge disclosure of
any questionable position, regardless of whether she believes that it has
a realistic possibility of success.95 Such action might not be in the
client's best interest because the disclosure is likely to increase the risk
92. See generally Schenk, supra note 88, at 419.
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1997). For a discussion of the
application of the attorney-client privilege in this context, see infra text accompanying notes 216-44.
94. See Schenk, supra note 88, at 392 n.24, 405.
95. This is not an idle concern. If the IRS suspects that an individual preparer's noncompliance
is widespread, it may recommend "program action" under which the returns all of the preparer's
clients may be examined. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 49 (citing Internal Revenue Audit
Manual).
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of an audit, and if the taxpayer has to defend the position in court, the
cost of the defense could be considerable. Thus, the interests of the
client and the attorney-preparer could further conflict.
If so, there are several things to bear in mind. First and foremost, only
the client can make the ultimate decision to disclose. If the client does
not wish to disclose the position, the lawyer may not ethically continue
to recommend disclosure without revealing her own conflict of interest.
If the client's position falls into the gray area of uncertainty as to whether
there is a one-in-three chance of success, the client's decision not to
disclose should not be affected by the preparer's penalty, particularly if
the preparer is subject to a higher standard. The lawyer's primary duty
is owed to the client. As a return preparer, the lawyer should not put her
own interests above the client's, even though the lawyer may feel that she
cannot legally or ethically sign the client's return.
If the preparer signs the return, she might find herself subject to an
understatement penalty, even though the client is not subject to a
comparable penalty. On the one hand, it is both poor policy and patently
unfair to subject a preparer to a penalty for recommending a position that
the client is legally and ethically entitled to take. On the other hand, the
complexities of the tax law make it extremely difficult for the average
layperson to determine whether there Js a reasonable basis for every
position, and often impossible to determine whether there is substantial
authority for a return position.96 Return preparers, therefore, should be
held to a higher standard, at least in this case.
In addition to the lawyer's duties to the government that are derivative
of the client's duties, the lawyer owes the government a separate duty not
to misrepresent a return position as being stronger than the lawyer thinks
it is. Because so few returns are audited, this would undermine the self-
assessment system. This duty, however, is a legal duty. If the lawyer
recommends such a position, she would be violating the Code as well as
Circular 230. But if the lawyer thinks the client has a reasonable basis
for the position, even though technically there might not be a realistic
possibility of success on the merits if the position were litigated, the
client is legally and ethically entitled to assert the position without
disclosure.
96. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (1994) (stating that the taxpayer understatement penalty may
be avoided with substantial authority). The problem is that the authority must be substantial, which
is a more stringent standard than the reasonable basis standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2)
(1998). This standard is met if the weight of authority supporting the position is substantial with
respect to the weight of authority supporting contrary treatment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
Most laypersons are not competent to make this determination. For example, most laypersons are
clueless as to the weight that should be accorded a proposed regulation as compared to a private letter
ruling.
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The question then is what is the lawyer's duty? Clearly, the lawyer
may not reveal the position without the client's consent. The lawyer may
then be in a situation in which the client's position is lawful. Although,
the client is legally and ethically entitled to take the position without
disclosure, the lawyer is obligated either to reveal the position or refuse
to sign the return, provided the lawyer is otherwise the signing preparer
under both the Code and Circular 230.
If the lawyer thinks it might be a close question as to whether the
position has a realistic possibility of success,97 and the client will not
authorize disclosure after being informed of the possible consequences,98
the lawyer should then sign the return (if, indeed the lawyer is otherwise
the signing preparer). Close questions should generally be resolved in
favor of the client, although the lawyer should protect herself by making
and retaining copious notes detailing the advice given to the client. If,
on the other hand, the lawyer believes that the position is not frivolous
but there clearly is no realistic possibility of success on the merits, the
lawyer's advice on the position and her signature on the return without
disclosure would constitute a misrepresentation. In this case, the lawyer
should not sign the return because she is legally and ethically prohibited
from doing so under the Code and Circular 230. Note, however, that the
client legally may be entitled to take the position without disclosure, and
thus the difference between the standards of the preparer and the
standards of the taxpayer-client creates a clear and unresolvable conflict.
The next question, then, is whether the lawyer should continue to
represent the client. The answer depends upon whether the understatement
penalty creates a normative standard of conduct for taxpayers or whether,
as one commentator has stated, it constitutes the price of an exercise of
a free choice under the applicable law.99 As long as the position taken
is not frivolous, the lawyer does not necessarily have to withdraw from
representation,' 0 although the lawyer may not have that choice because
the client may no longer wish to have the lawyer represent him. If,
however, the client does wish to have the lawyer continue the representa-
97. This can occur, for example, when the position presents a novel question of law, or when
the position will involve arguing for a change in or modification to the existing law. When all is said
and done, the only quantification that the preparer can generally make is a guess as to whether "the
position flies or does not fly." Schenk, supra note 88, at 392-93 n.24.
98. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(2) (1998) (stating that the practitioner must advise client of
potential penalties for failure to disclose and of opportunities to avoid the penalties).
99. See Holden, supra note 44, at 330-31 (comparing former section 6661 with current section
6662).
100. The lawyer, however, may do so if she chooses. See Schenk, supra note 88, at 403-04 n.61
(stating that as long as the withdrawal does not adversely affect the client, both the Model Rules and
the Model Code permit the lawyer to withdraw from employment on the ground that she does not
approve of the client's actions).
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tion, the lawyer should note that continued representation of the client has
become much more complex because the client has demonstrated a
willingness to take a risky return position. Therefore, the lawyer may
have a greater duty of inquiry if she continues to represent the client.'0'
Moreover, if the return position could affect other items on that return,
or if it could affect the tax treatment of items in other taxable years, the
lawyer's continued representation might compromise the client if the
client is audited because the lawyer, if asked directly, would have to
reveal the fact that she had advised the client that the position lacked a
realistic possibility of success if litigated.'0 2
The third opportunity to avoid the substantial understatement penalty
is through proof that the position has a reasonable basis and that the
taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in good faith, even though there
is no substantial authority for the position and no disclosure was made.'0 3
According to the regulations, reasonable cause is a facts and circumstanc-
es determination to be made on a case-by-case basis."0 4 The most
important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the proper
tax liability.'0 5 Reliance on the advice of a professional can constitute
reasonable cause, provided the taxpayer reasonably relied on the advice.0 6
101. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(3) ("[The] practitioner may not ignore the implications of
information furnished to, or actually known by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable inquiries
if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or incomplete.").
102. See infra text accompanying notes 210-15.
103. See I.R.C. § 6664(c) (1994). This was the standard used for negligence under the prior law.
See Holden, supra note 44, at 332-34 (discussing whether the accuracy-related penalties establish a
normative standard of conduct). Negligence is now an accuracy-related penalty under section
6662(b)(1), subject to the reasonable cause exception under section 6664(c). See I.R.C. §§
6662(b)(1), 6664(c).
104. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (as amended in 1995).
105. See id. In judging the extent of the taxpayer's efforts to comply, the IRS will examine the
reason for noncompliance, the taxpayer's previous compliance history, and the length of time the
taxpayer took to subsequently comply, as well as whether any noncompliance was due to
circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (20)132.4 (1996)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK].
106, See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 251 (1985) (stating that good faith reliance
on the advice of an attorney is, under certain circumstances, a defense to underpayment of income
tax); Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365, 372 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing negligence penalty
because court determined that taxpayer had relied in good faith on the advice of an accountant).
There are two minimum prerequisites for reliance on a tax advisor to be considered reasonable
cause. First, the advice must be based on all the relevant facts and circumstances and on the law as
it relates to those facts and circumstances. See HANDBOOK, supra note 105, (20)133.54. The
taxpayer also must have made full disclosure to the advisor. See id. Second, the advice must be
based on reasonable factual or legal assumptions, and the advisor must be competent. See id.
Although the Handbook does not so state, the taxpayer also must have followed the advice. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 1995) ("Reliance on ... professional advice ...
constitutes reasonable cause and good faith if, under all the circumstances, such reliance was
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The problem, however, is that this defense may jeopardize the advisor,
who may find herself subject to a preparer penalty.10 7
Clearly, the reasonable cause and good faith defense cannot apply to
a frivolous position. Therefore, the taxpayer's accuracy standard is a
"reasonable basis" for the position.'08 This seems to fall somewhere
below the realistic possibility standard (one-in-three chance of success)
of the preparer.0 9 If this is the case, it is yet another conflict between the
taxpayer's and the practitioner's reporting standards. If the return
position passes the lower reasonable basis standard but not the greater
realistic possibility standard, the client who relies on the advice of a
professional and does not disclose the position would be protected
because the advice of the tax advisor would constitute a defense to the
penalty. The preparer, however, would have no defense and would be
subject to the preparer penalty unless the position is disclosed. Moreover,
Circular 230 prohibits the preparer from signing the return without
disclosure."' Thus, the preparer may be subject to a civil penalty under
the Code, as well as a sanction from the Director of Practice under
Circular 230."'
If the lawyer's duty to the government is derivative of the client's
duty, why should the lawyer owe a greater ethical duty to the government
than the client owes? One reason is that the advisor or return preparer,
by virtue of being an expert in tax matters, is held to a higher standard
of knowledge than the lay taxpayer in order to preserve the integrity of
the self-assessment system. If this were not the case, taxpayers would
feel freer than they already do to search with impunity for the advice they
want to hear and perhaps the defense that, no matter how spurious the
reasonable and the taxpayer acted in good faith.").
107. See Raby & Raby, supra note 52, at 1465; see also infra note 233 and accompanying text
(discussing effect of advice of counsel defense on attorney-client privilege).
108. See Holden, supra note 44, at 332-35 (discussing the rationale behind the standard).
109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1995) (defining reasonable basis as a
relatively high standard of tax reporting that is "significantly higher than the not frivolous standard").
The reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is merely arguable or that is
merely a colorable claim. If a return position is reasonably based on one or more of the authorities
set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (taking into account the relevance and persuasiveness
of the authorities and subsequent developments), the return position generally will satisfy the
reasonable basis standard, even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard as defined
in Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2). See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4 (as amended in 1995). In addition, the
reasonable cause and good faith exception, as set forth in Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4, may provide relief
from the penalty, even if a return position does not satisfy the reasonable basis standard. See
Handelman, supra note 21, at 88 n.59 (noting that the "'realistic possibility of success' standard is
widely regarded as higher than the 'reasonable basis' standard"); Holden, supra note 44, at 771-72
(charting the various standards).
110. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (1998).
111. See I.R.C. § 6694(a); 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.34(b), 10.52.
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advice, they nevertheless acted with reasonable cause and in good faith
in relying upon the advice of this professional. The IRS would then have
to beef up its audit procedures in order to police this type of activity.
More resources would have to be allocated to the IRS to increase and
train its personnel in order to level the audit lottery playing field. But
this would involve greater government intrusion into the lives of the
citizens and higher taxes from the citizenry to pay for the intrusion-a
politically unfeasible idea.
While the foregoing may suggest that the lawyer has a duty to the
revenue system, the lawyer has no such discrete duty. First, the higher
standard of the advisor or preparer is imposed upon lawyers and others
who prepare returns and are admitted to practice before the IRS."
2
Therefore, lawyers owe no discrete duty to the government, but, rather,
they share any duty with other professionals. Second, because the
preparer's standard is set forth in both the Code and Circular 230 with
potentially severe penalties for violations, the lawyer owes no separate
duty to the government beyond simply to obey the rules." 3
3. Ethical Standards and Mistake
If the taxpayer has made a mistake on a return that has been previously
filed, the preparer must advise the taxpayer to disclose the error to the
government and also must advise the taxpayer of any penalties that may
be imposed for failure to disclose."' If the error was innocent and will
not affect other taxable years, the preparer has no further obligation."'
If the error was not innocent, it may constitute tax fraud, which is
discussed below. If, however, the error was innocently made but would
affect other taxable years, or the mistake was made by the preparer
instead of the taxpayer and the taxpayer refuses to permit the preparer to
disclose the error, the preparer must withdraw from further representation.
Otherwise, the preparer may have participated, or be deemed to have
participated, in giving misleading information to the government. This
would constitute disreputable conduct under Circular 230,'6 which could
subject the preparer to sanctions." 7 In general, a lawyer or preparer is
112. See discussion supra note 7.
113. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(2).
114. See id.
115. But see infra text accompanying notes 210-11 (noting that an attorney must be careful in
representing the client at an audit).
116. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (b) (stating that facts contained in federal tax returns may constitute
information, which, if the preparer knows the information to be false or misleading, may subject the
preparer to penalty).
117. It also might subject the preparer to other penalties under the Code. See I.R.C. § 6701
(1994) (aiding and abetting); I.R.C. § 7206(2) (1994) (aiding or assisting in a false return).
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not permitted ethically to reveal the error to the government without the
client's permission because of the duty of confidentiality owed to the
client under lawyers' rules of professional responsibility."'
A long-standing, unresolved ethical problem arises when an IRS agent
makes a mistake in favor of a taxpayer. Does the lawyer have a duty to
disclose the error to the IRS or is the lawyer prohibited from disclosing
by virtue of the duty of confidentiality? In order to analyze this problem,
it is first necessary to determine to whom the lawyer owes the primary
duty-the tax system in general, the government in particular, or the
client? Then, it is necessary to reduce the problem to its underlying
context. The issue arises in connection with four potential mistakes: (1)
a math error, (2) a mistake of law, (3) a mistake of fact where the agent
misstates the facts, and (4) a mistake of fact where the agent correctly
states the facts but misinterprets them. Finally, it is necessary to
determine which rules of ethics apply.
a. The Primary Duty
If the lawyer's primary duty is to "protect the revenue,""' 9 the answer
is simple: the lawyer must always reveal to the government any error
that would be adverse to the treasury. Similarly, if the primary duty is
owed to the tax system, to ensure that the system is "functioning
honestly, fairly and smoothly,"'2 ° the lawyer would be obligated to
disclose the error because otherwise the taxpayer would profit wrongfully
at the expense of the government. This, however, raises an obvious
problem. Under the ABA's view, the government is an adversary and the
lawyer is the representative of the client.' If the lawyer's primary duty
is to consider the effect on the treasury or the smooth functioning of the
tax system or both above all other considerations, the lawyer cannot
effectively represent her client in an adversarial proceeding with the
government.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer's primary duty is to the client, the
lawyer may not be able to reveal the error without the client's permission
because the duty of confidentiality may control.' This enables the
118. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997) (stating that a lawyer shall
not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client consents). A way
around the problem of disclosure is an advance agreement with the client that all material errors
relevant to the issues in question (whether audit or administrative appeal) are to be disclosed. See
Frederic G. Comeel, The Service and the Private Practitioner: Face to Face and Hand in Hand-A
Private Practitioner's View, 11 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 343, 349-50 (1994) (discussing this issue).
119. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
121. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
122. See id.
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lawyer to function as an effective advocate for the client. The question
becomes whether the duty of confidentiality always controls or whether
there are instances in which the lawyer can and should reveal the error.
If so, must the lawyer first consult with the client? What if the client
directs the lawyer not to reveal the error-may (or must) the lawyer do
so anyway?
If the failure to reveal the error constitutes fraud or misrepresentation
on the part of the lawyer, the lawyer must either persuade the client to
allow the error to be revealed, or the lawyer must withdraw from
representing the client. The lawyer is ethically required to do so under
the Model Rules."' The Model Rules also require a lawyer to be truthful
when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but the lawyer generally
"has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts."' 24
A failure to act, however, may constitute a misrepresentation. 125  Thus,
the lawyer must balance the duty of confidentiality to the client with the
duty of truthfulness and fairness to third parties.
i. Mathematical Error
When the problem of the error is analyzed in more depth, the issues
may change and the results may vary. Consider, for instance, a math
error. There are several general ways in which such an error may arise.
One is in an oral or face-to-face consultation with an IRS agent, as in an
office or field audit. There are several reasons why this type of
consultation is very different from written correspondence. First, because
of the give and take between the parties, it may be much easier for the
lawyer's silence to mislead the agent. If the lawyer has an affirmative
duty to correct the agent's error, her failure to do so may make her a
party to the error. If so, this would constitute disreputable conduct that
could subject her to sanction under Circular 230'26 and perhaps under the
123. See id. Rule 1.2(d) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent .. "); id. Rule 1.16 (a)(1) (stating that the
lawyer must withdraw from representation if continued representation would "result in a violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law"). But see infra notes 208-10 and accompanying
text (discussing the "noisy withdrawal").
124. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rule 4.1 cmt. (1997).
125. See id.
126. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (b) (stating that giving false or misleading information to a Treasury
employee is disreputable conduct); 31 C.F.R. § 10.510) (defining reckless conduct as "a highly
unreasonable omission or misrepresentation involving an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care that a practitioner should observe under the circumstances").
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Model Rules as well. 27  Second, because of
the nature of an oral or face-to-face consultation, the lawyer may be
required to make split-second decisions in which there may be no time
to consult with the client. Therefore, the lawyer may have to use her
own judgment, taking a variety of factors into account. Third, in
connection with a lawyer's representation of a client before the IRS, it is
important that the lawyer gain the trust and respect of the revenue agent.
Even if the lawyer's silence is not egregious enough to subject her to
direct sanctions, the agent may think that the lawyer is untrustworthy, and
thus, would be less inclined to deal favorably with the lawyer and her
clients from that point on. This could jeopardize not only the client in
question, but also the lawyer's other clients as well. Moreover, the agent
may think that the lawyer's silence is suspicious or that she is attempting
to conceal information with respect to this particular client. The agent
may then decide that a more in-depth audit is warranted. Thus, it is
advantageous to all the parties for the lawyer to correct the error, and the
lawyer should not need the permission of the client to do so.'28
This type of error, a mistake of the revenue agent favorable to the
taxpayer-client, should not be protected by an ethical duty of confiden-
tiality. It is not information adverse to the client because the client was
never legally entitled to benefit from the error. Instead, it should be
regarded as information impliedly authorized to be revealed in order to
ensure effective representation of this client and other clients. 29
When the error arises in a written correspondence or on a tax return,
the issue is trickier because there is usually ample time to consult with
the client. Furthermore, if the examination or negotiations have been
reduced to writing, they are likely to be at a more advanced stage than
they would be in an oral consultation, leaving the client with more at
stake. In general, unless the error is minor enough to be considered a
scrivener's error, 3 the lawyer cannot reveal the error without the client's
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.! cmt. (1997) ("A misrepresentation
can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows
is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act."). If the lawyer's affirmative duty is
great enough, her nonfeasance may result in civil liability under the Code. See I.R.C. § 6701 (1994)
(aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability).
128. Note that the ABA informally takes the position that a mere scrivener's error is not subject
to the duty of confidentiality. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal
Op. 1518 (1986) (stating that "scrivener's error" may be revealed to opponent without client's
consent; if client is consulted and refuses to authorize disclosure, lawyer may be involved in fraud).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1997) (stating that permission
to disclose is implied when necessary to effectively represent the client).
130. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1518 (1986).
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express permission.' But mathematical errors may vary in degree and
documents may vary in importance. These factors could have a bearing
on the lawyer's duty. For example, if at the conclusion of an income tax
audit or an administrative appeal the taxpayer and the government are in
agreement or partial agreement on the adjustments to be made, there are
three general types of forms that the government may use to finalize the
agreement.
The first type is the Form 870,132 which waives the statutory restric-
tions on the government's ability to assess an income tax deficiency.'
Form 870 is routinely used at the conclusion of an income tax audit and
may also be used at the conclusion of an administrative appeal. Although
Form 870 usually signals the final disposition of a case, it does not
prevent either party from subsequently contesting previously agreed upon
issues. For instance, the government subsequently may assert an
additional deficiency and the taxpayer subsequently may file a suit for
refund. Thus, except for the waiver of the statutory notice of deficiency,
Form 870 does not purport to be a binding agreement between the
parties. 13
4
Because Form 870 is not binding, the lawyer should have more
freedom to reveal any mathematical error of the revenue agent in the
underlying agreement without prior consultation with the client because
the client will still be vulnerable until the close of the statute of
limitations. By revealing the error, the lawyer establishes trust with the
agent (a valuable asset) and ultimately provides better protection and
representation of the client. Furthermore, because the agreement is not
binding, the government may raise the issue of the error at any time
131. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (stating that a lawyer cannot
reveal a client confidence without the permission of the client).
132. Waiver of Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Deficiency in Tax and Acceptance
of Overassessment, Form 870 (1997). This waiver is authorized by I.R.C. § 6213(d) (1994). After
Form 870 is signed by the taxpayer, the government may immediately assess the tax liability without
having to send a statutory notice of deficiency and without having to observe the statutory 90-day
waiting period. See I.RC. § 6213(a) (1994) (listing restrictions on assessment and petition to Tax
Court). The taxpayer is foreclosed from petitioning the Tax Court to redetermine the deficiency
because a statutory notice of deficiency (also called a "90-day letter") is a prerequisite to Tax Court
jurisdiction. See id. Another effect of Form 870 is that it stops the running of interest after 30 days
from the filing of the waiver unless, within that period, the IRS has issued a notice and demand for
payment of the assessed tax liability. See I.R.C. § 6601(c) (1994).
133. A similar form may be used for other tax liabilities. For example, a Form 890 may be used
to consent to estate and gift tax assessments without a deficiency notice.
134. See Joyce v. Gentsch, 141 F.2d 891, 895 (6th Cir. 1944) ("The instrument in terms did not
even purport to bind the Government."); see also Maloney v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (P-H) 367
(1986) (holding that the Commissioner could issue a notice of deficiency after the Form 870 had
been executed because there was no binding closing agreement in effect).
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before the expiration of the statute of limitations. 3' Thus, neither the
agreement nor any subsequent assessment pursuant to the agreement can
be considered final until the expiration of the statutory period.
The second type of form commonly used by the IRS is Form 870-
AD,'36 which finalizes the agreement between the government and the
taxpayer at the conclusion of an income tax appeal in which mutual
concessions are made in settlement of the case.' In this type of
settlement, both parties typically have relatively strong positions, and
there is substantial uncertainty on both sides about the outcome if the
case should proceed to court. Understandably, neither the taxpayer nor
the government is willing to fully concede the disputed issues. Thus,
each party makes concessions based on the relative strength of their
position, and a settlement is reached.
Form 870-AD, unlike Form 870, is effective only when it is accepted
by the government.' The taxpayer agrees to the terms of the settlement
and waives the statutory limitations on assessment and collection (the
statutory notice of deficiency)."' The government also agrees not to
reopen the case absent "fraud, malfeasance, concealment, or misrepresen-
tation of a material fact, [or] an important mistake in mathematical
calculations."'
' 40
What constitutes an "important" mathematical mistake? Because IRS
materials do not define the term, it is presumed that the rules of contract
(or on occasion, criminal) law apply. If so, the agreement may be voided
if the mistake adversely affects the agreement between the parties. Thus,
a case may be reopened, even though a small amount of tax liability is
at issue, if the amount represents a large percentage of the settlement
agreed upon in Form 870-AD. But the term "important mistake" is a
subjective one, and thus may be subject to varying interpretations. The
135. The general statute of limitations is three years from the later of the due date of the return
or the date the return was actually filed. See I.R.C. § 6501(c) (1994). When a tax liability is paid
after the return is filed (or if no return is filed but a liability is paid), the statutory period is two years
from the date of payment (for purposes of a refund if no return was filed), if that period is greater
than the general three year period. See id. If no return is filed or if there is fraud on a filed return,
the statute never runs and the liability can always be assessed. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). If there is
a substantial omission of an item of income greater than 25% of the gross income required to be
shown on the return, the general statutory period is extended to six years. See I.R.C. § 6501(e).
136. Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Deficiency and to Accept
Overassessment, Form 870-AD (1997). Like the Form 870, the Form 870-AD is authorized by
I.R.C. § 6213(d) (1994).
137. Similar forms are used for other types of taxes, such as a Form 890-AD for estate tax
appeals.
138. See Form 870-AD (1997) (stating that offer is subject to acceptance by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, and that until the offer is accepted, it "shall have no force or effect").
139. See id.
140. Id.
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lawyer can never be certain of the finality of the settlement agreement if
there is a mathematical error. In addition, there is the previously
mentioned problem of good faith, fair dealing, and trust between the
parties. If the revenue agent thinks the lawyer is untrustworthy, this may
jeopardize not only the client in question, but also the lawyer's other
clients in dealing with the IRS. It is, therefore, in the best interest of
both the lawyer and the client to reveal the error. As the client's
representative, the attorney should not need the permission of the client
to disclose, although it is not clear under the Model Rules that such
disclosure is permissible. 4 '
The third type of agreement is the closing agreement, which is a final,
binding agreement with respect to the expressly delineated issues in the
document. 4 ' Once a closing agreement has been signed, neither the
government nor the taxpayer may reopen the case without a showing of
fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of material fact.'43 In the
absence of any of these three grounds, a closing agreement remains valid
and binding. The attorney, therefore, cannot reveal the mathematical
error to the government without the client's express permission because
the revelation would not serve any interest of the client other than the
satisfaction of doing the morally correct thing, even though there is no
corresponding legal obligation to do so. It is very unlikely that the case
will be reopened, and the chances are slim that the attorney's other clients
will be adversely affected in dealings with the IRS. Thu, the attorney's
duty to behave morally must take a back seat to the attorney's duty to her
client because in this situation the client's interest is paramount to the
attorney's interest. Thus, the morally correct action by the attorney is not
permitted under the Model Rules.
ii. Mistake of Law
The second type of general mistake that may arise in dealing with an
IRS agent is a mistake of law. This is usually a much more complex
problem than the mathematical error because it is not a simple computa-
141. Under Model Rule 1.6, there are very narrow grounds for revealing client confidences
without the client's permission. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
But if the lawyer is required to do nothing further with respect to Form 870 or 870-AD, the question
remains whether the lawyer's failure to reveal the error constitutes a misrepresentation. If not, then
under the Model Rules, the duty of confidentiality appears to control, and the lawyer may not reveal
the error without the client's express permission. See id. Other than advising the client to permit
the lawyer to disclose and advising the client of the consequences of nondisclosure, the lawyer has
no further obligation. See id Conversely, the argument might be made that the disclosure is
necessary to effectively carry out the representation of the client. See id. Rule 1.6(a).
142. Such an agreement is expressly authorized under IR.C. § 7121 (1994).
143. See id. § 7121(b); Treas. Reg. § 301.7121-1(c) (1998).
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tional error in which the magnitude of the mistake is directly proportional
to the likelihood of its being detected. Instead, it is an error that usually
reflects on the competence and diligence of the agent. When the error
arises in a nonbinding agreement, the case may be reopened at any time
provided the statute of limitations is open. 44 Thus, closure occurs only
with the passage of time, and until then, neither of the parties should
have any firm expectation of finality.
While to some extent the same considerations inherent in the mathe-
matical error also apply to the mistake of law, such as the lack of trust
and adverse consequences to the attorney's other clients, the situation is
somewhat different. First, a mistake of law generally tends to be a more
serious mistake than a mathematical miscomputation. Second, the ABA
considers the government in this context an adversary or potential
adversary.'45  As such, the lawyer has no obligation to make the
government's case for it, although the lawyer may not affirm the error or
incorporate the error into any document or argument. 46  Instead, the
lawyer is the representative of the taxpayer and thus owes a primary duty
to the taxpayer.
Conversely, there is the issue of the taxpayer's wrongful profiting at
the expense of the government. The taxpayer is morally not entitled to
do this. As a matter of professional ethics, however, the issue of whether
to reveal the error should be left to the taxpayer. Thus, the attorney
should not reveal the mistake without the client's permission.
A mistake of law is not one of the factors that allows the settlement
agreement (Form 870-AD) to be reopened. 147 However, Form 870-AD,
by its terms, is not a binding closing agreement. 4 In the past, courts
have had problems distinguishing when the parties are bound by Form
870-AD and when they are not. For instance, there may be legitimate
situations in which a taxpayer wishes to reopen the case and disregard
Form 870-AD, such as when there has been a retroactive change in the
144. See Maloney v. Commissioner, 86 T.C.M. (CCH) 86,091 (1986) (stating that the IRS may
issue a notice of deficiency when there is no binding agreement).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 23-49.
146. See MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(a) (1997); see also Staumm Int'l
Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315, 325 (1988) (holding that IRS was bound by settlement
agreement notwithstanding its unilateral mistake in calculating amount owed by the taxpayer). Of
course, the lawyer must not espouse a return position that has no basis in law. This would amount
to disreputable conduct under Circular 230. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (1998).
147. See supra text accompanying note 140.
148. See Offer to Waive Restrictions on Assessment and Collection of Tax Deficiency and to
Accept Overassessment, Form 870-AD (1997).
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law.' But there are other situations in which taxpayers attempt to gain
an unfair advantage by paying the amount agreed upon and then later
filing a claim for a refund after the statute of limitations has barred.
further assessment.' 50 In these cases, estoppel may apply to prevent the
taxpayer from reneging on the settlement agreement.' On the other
hand, some courts have regarded Form 870-AD as nonbinding and have
allowed taxpayers to file their refund claims."
An attorney cannot be certain, however, that a court will determine that
a settlement agreement is nonbinding. If the agreement can be reopened
at any time, it might be in the client's best interest to reveal the error
because if the government discovers the error first and reopens the case,
the client may be disadvantaged if the government perceives that it has
not been dealt with fairly. According to the Model Rules, however, the
lawyer cannot disclose the error without the client's permission.'5
A closing agreement is statutorily final and binding,"5 4 and can be
reopened only upon a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresenta-
tion of a material fact.' A mistake of law does not constitute a ground
for reopening the case. The attorney, therefore, may not reveal the error
without express permission from her client because disclosure otherwise
would serve no useful purpose in representing the client and may even
prejudice the client's interest.
149. See, e.g., Stair v. United States, 516 F.2d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 1975) (referring to intervening
court decision); Guggenheim v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 186, 187 (Ct. Cl. 1948) (referring to
retroactive change in the statute).
150. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1567, 1573 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that although the Form 870-AD was not binding, equitable estoppel precludes the taxpayer
from challenging its validity); Kretchmar v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 191, 198 (1985) (holding that
provided the conditions are met, a Form 870-AD could equitably estop the taxpayer from litigating
a refund claim).
151. See, e.g., Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282,289 (1929) (concluding that
agreement between taxpayer and IRS that does not satisfy the formalities of a statutory closing
agreement for settlement or compromise is not binding on either party); Aronsohn v. Commissioner,
988 F.2d 454, 457 (3rd Cir. 1993) (upholding lower court ruling that Form 870-AD can constitute
an equitably binding agreement); Flynn v. United States, 786 F.2d 586, 591 (3rd Cir. 1986)
(concluding that a taxpayer, attacking the validity of an agreement, must show that equitable relief
is appropriate).
152. See, e.g., Whitney v. United States, 826 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1987); Uinta Livestock
Corp. v. United States, 355 F.2d 761,765 (10th Cir. 1966); Bennett v. United States, 231 F.2d 465,
467-68 (7th Cir. 1956).
153. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997) (discussing confidentiality
of information).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
155. See supra text accompanying note 143.
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iii. Mistake of Fact
When the agent misstates material facts in an oral confrontation, the
lawyer has a duty to correct the agent because otherwise her silence
would be deliberately misleading." 6 For the same reasons discussed
above in connection with the mathematical error in the face-to-face
consultation, the lawyer should not need the permission of her client to
reveal this error.
When, however, the agent misinterprets correctly stated facts, the
situation is trickier. If the lawyer chooses not to disclose the error, her
silence may be considered deliberately misleading, although her conduct
could technically fall within the permissible limits of both Circular 230
and the Model Rules.' If the lawyer's silence could be considered a
misrepresentation of material fact, she has an affirmative duty under the
Model Rules and Circular 230 to reveal the error and she should not need
the permission of the client to do so." 8
If the misrepresentation could not be considered material, the question
is whether the lawyer should reveal the error anyway. If the mistake
affects the finality of the agreement, the lawyer should reveal the error
and she should not need the express permission of the client to do so.
Instead, this should be regarded as the type of information which the
lawyer has implied permission from the client to disclose in order to
effectively represent the client."s
If the mistake is not material and the finality of the agreement is not
affected, the lawyer probably should disclose, even without the prior
express permission of the client, for the same reason-this should fall
under the auspices of implied consent because of the important consider-
ation of establishing trust with the revenue agent in order to effectively
represent this client as well as other clients with matters pending, or
potentially pending, before the IRS.
156. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (discussing truthfulness in dealing
with third parties); 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(b) (1998) (stating that participating in the giving of false or
misleading information to a Treasury officer or employee constitutes disreputable conduct).
157. Under the Model Rules, if the misinterpretation is not material, the lawyer has no ethical
duty to correct the agent. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1. Under Circular
230, the lawyer is not giving misleading information. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(b). The question is
whether the lawyer can be regarded as participating in the giving of misleading information. If the
facts are correctly stated, it is certainly arguable that the lawyer has no further duty under Circular
230. See id. (stating grounds for disreputable conduct).
158. See supra note 157. Note that the lawyer may not volunteer information, even if it is
material, without the client's permission. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at 126 (discussing
disclosure of facts on audit).
159. Such disclosure is permitted under Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (stating that disclosure without prior express permission of the client is
permitted if the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to properly represent the client).
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iv. Tax Fraud and Ethical Conflicts
Representing a client who has committed tax fraud presents a complex
ethical dilemma for an attorney because it involves a choice between
preserving the client's confidence or revealing the fraud to the govern-
ment. The Model Rules require an attorney to disclose "a material fact
to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by the client."'"6 But, as previously mentioned, the ABA
does not consider the IRS a tribunal,' 6 ' so the special disclosure
obligations owed to tribunals under the Model Rules are not operative in
dealings with the IRS. Instead, the Model Rules generally prohibit the
attorney from revealing confidential information without the client's
permission.'62
On the other hand, according to the ABA, the attorney has a duty not
to mislead the government "either by misstatements or by silence or by
permitting his client to mislead." '63  This duty is echoed in Circular
230, ' which also provides that an attorney who participates in or
perpetrates a fraud on the government will be disbarred from practicing
before the IRS.'65 This can have further serious consequences for the
attorney. First, an IRS disbarment may trigger state disbarment
proceedings.'66 Second, under Circular 230, an attorney may not obtain
assistance from or hire a person who has been disbarred from practicing
before the IRS. 67 If the disbarred attorney is a member of a law firm or
160. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(2).
161. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
162. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a). Moreover, the ethics
committees of several states have held that lawyers cannot reveal misstatements made by a client to
tax authorities unless the client authorizes the disclosure. See WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 62, at
155 (listing Alabama and New York as two such states).
163. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
164. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.5 1(b) (1998). Circular 230 includes within its definition of disreputable
conduct "giving false or misleading information, or participating in any way in the giving of false
or misleading information . I..." d. It further defines reckless conduct as "a highly unreasonable
omission or misrepresentation involving an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care
that a practitioner should observe under the circumstances." Id. § 10.510).
165. See id. §§ 10.50, 10.51. There are several types of disreputable conduct under 31 C.F.R.
§ 10.51 that may be considered fraudulent: conviction of tax fraud, giving false or misleading
information to the government, committing tax fraud or advising a client to do so, misappropriating
client funds received for the purpose of paying taxes or any other obligations due the U.S.,
knowingly, recklessly, or through gross incompetence giving a false opinion to the government or
establishing a pattern of fraudulent conduct. See id. § 10.5 1(a), (b), (d), (e) & (j).
166. The converse is also true. See id. § 10.5 l(g) (listing disbarment or suspension from practice
as an attorney as disreputable conduct for which an attorney may be disbarred from practicing before
the IRS); see also id. § 10.76(b) (stating that suspension, or revocation for cause, of license to
practice law is ground for expedited suspension from practice before the IRS).
167. See id. § 10.24(a).
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an accounting firm, this means that the firm must either cease its tax
work altogether or disassociate itself from that attorney. 6 The choices
are that simple and devastating.
When the attorney discovers in advance that her client intends to
mislead or defraud the government or any other third party, under the
Model Rules the attorney may inform the client of the consequences and
must advise the client not to undertake this action. 69 If the client
persists, the attorney must withdraw from representing the client in order
to avoid being a party to the fraud. 7
In the more common and difficult situation, however, when the
attorney subsequently discovers that the client has misled or defrauded the
government or other third party, the attorney's obligations to the client
and to the government will depend on the initial role of the attorney, and
on the circumstances of the noncompliance, error, or omission. Circular
230 requires the attorney to advise the client promptly of the "noncompli-
ance, error, or omission"'' but it does not address the issue of what
happens afterward. Yet the consequences may vary tremendously,
depending upon whether the noncompliance, error, or omission amounts
to an innocent error, negligence, or fraud. In the case of fraud, the
consequences to the client may be severe. Thus, advising a client to
correct a questionable return position without fully informing the client
of the consequences of fraud on a return may itself constitute a violation
of Circular 230,"' as well as expose the lawyer to a malpractice claim.
In any case, whether or not to file an amended return is solely the
decision of the client. Failure to inform the client fully of the conse-
quences of the fraud means that the client cannot make an informed
decision.
This presents the first hurdle for the attorney: determining whether
the noncompliance, error, or omission amounts to fraud. Tax fraud is not
specifically defined under the Code' and may include a variety of
offenses. 4 A common element of each offense, however, is willful
conduct, which is defined as "an intentional violation of a known legal
168. See id. § 10.24(b). Maintaining a law partnership with a person who has been disbarred
from practicing before the IRS constitutes disreputable conduct under Circular 230. See id. §
10.51(h).
169. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1997); ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
170. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1997).
171. 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1998).
172. See id. § i 0.34(a)(2) ("A practitioner... must inform the client of the penalties reasonably
likely to apply ... with respect to the position advised .... ).
173. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6663 (1994) (providing for a civil fraud penalty).
174. See I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207 (1994) (providing for various criminal penalties).
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duty."'75 The difficulty lies in distinguishing between an intentional or
willful violation, and ordinary negligence. At the extremes, the two are
readily distinguishable. Even nontax lawyers may find themselves
representing clients facing "piggyback" tax fraud charges in cases
involving an undeclared, illegal source income."" But between the
extremes there is a chasm in which it is very difficult to distinguish
between willfulness and negligence. It is a very subjective determination,
and those who tend to think along the lines of Justice Potter Stewart that,
like obscenity, they will "know it when [they] see it"'' " may find
themselves badly mistaken.'
Fraud is proved by circumstantial evidence. The IRS publishes a list
of so-called "badges of fraud," which are red flags that revenue agents
are instructed to look for in interviews with taxpayers as suggestive of
fraudulent acts. These include maintaining a double set of books, lying
to a revenue agent, concealing assets or hiding the source of income,
making false entries or alterations, handling one's affairs to avoid making
records usual in transactions of that type, and a consistent pattern of
income understatement or overstatement of deductions.7
A second hurdle for the attorney is that there is a very fine line
between civil fraud and criminal fraud. Both involve the element of
willfulness, and the definition is apparently the same whether the fraud
is civil or criminal. ° In general, the degree of fraud will depend on the
175. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976).
176. Although this raises the spectre of drug dealing, there are a variety of nontax offenses that
may trigger tax fraud charges. Common examples include theft, extortion, embezzlement, and
misappropriation of fuhds. Note also that the fraud charge is not necessarily triggered by a
conviction. Because of the heavier burden of proof in a criminal trial, the government may prove
civil fraud in a subsequent trial even though the nontax criminal trial ended in an acquittal. See
MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE I 7b.01 [3][B] (1991) (discussing the effect
of prior conviction or acquittal).
177. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
178. See, e.g., United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 100 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the lower
court's finding that defendant was guilty of the criminal offense of tax evasion for her treatment of
a novel tax issue, and holding that "[a] criminal proceeding . . . is an inappropriate vehicle for
pioneering interpretations of tax law"); Spruill v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1197, 1248 (1987) (holding
that "[tihe record simply does not show that any part of the underpayment was due to fraud" six
years after the underpayment occurred); see also infra notes 266-315 and accompanying text
(discussing the tortious case of Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997)).
179. See, e.g., Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 499 (1943). In the case of Bradford v.
Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit gave its imprimatur to the use of the badges of fraud to infer
fraudulent intent. See 796 F.2d 303, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1986).
180. See SALTZMAN, supra note 176, at I 7b.01[3] ("The evasion element in fraud makes
principles announced in evasion cases-that willful conduct is an intentional violation of a known
legal duty ... seem also to apply to the civil fraud penalty.").
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egregiousness of the offense and the aggressiveness of the government."'
The classification is important, not only because of the substantive
differences between the sanctions, but also because of the procedural
differences between the statutes of limitation and the burdens of proof.
Fraud is never initially imputed or presumed; the government bears
the burden of proving intentional wrongdoing amounting to fraud." 2 In
the case of civil fraud, the government must establish its case with clear
and convincing evidence. In the case of criminal fraud, the burden must
be met beyond a reasonable doubt.
If the attorney suspects that a client has committed tax fraud, a third
hurdle lies in determining whether to advise the client to file either an
original return, if no return has previously been filed, or an honest,
amended return to correct the fraud. This could present a very difficult
ethical choice for the attorney.
The problem is that the attorney owes a legal duty to the client to
represent the client in the matter in which the attorney accepted employ-
ment. Thus, first and foremost, the attorney must consider the interests
of the client. But the attorney also has distinct duties that may conflict
with the client's interests. For example, according to the ABA, an
attorney has a duty to avoid deliberately misleading the IRS and to
prevent the client from doing so.' 3 If the attorney discovers that the
client has misled the government, the attorney must advise the client to
181. For instance, the government usually will not wage a criminal prosecution when the
taxpayer is seriously ill, mentally or physically. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 253
(Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that a taxpayer who shows he was unable to file due to physical
or mental incapacity might be excused from harsh section 6651 (a)(1) penalty). Also, the government
will pay close attention to the personal attributes of the taxpayer, such as level of education and
business acumen, in determining whether or not to prosecute. See, e.g., Grosshandler v.
Commissioner, 75 T.C. 1, 19 (1980) (prosecuting taxpayer, "an attorney and a well-educated person,"
for fraudulent failure to file returns); Gutterman Strauss Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 433 (1925)
(finding taxpayer not liable for fraud penalty when books did not accurately reflect income but were
kept by an inexperienced bookkeeper).
182. See 1.R.C. § 7454(a) (1994) (stating that burden of proof shall be upon the Secretary).
There is, however, an exception to the statement that fraud is never presumed. Once the government
meets its initial burden of proof, it will assess the fraud penalty on the entire underpayment. See
I.R.C. § 6663(b) (1994). The taxpayer then has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that only a portion of the underpayment is attributable to fraud. See id. The statutory shift
in the burden of proof was enacted in 1986. The result is a much more complicated trial for
taxpayers accused of fraud because it may not be obvious during the trial whether or not the
government has met its burden. Consequently, it may not be obvious to the taxpayer whether the
burden of proof has shifted. Moreover, while, in theory, the government's burden of proof was not
altered in the 1986 legislation, in practice, the government's burden is much lighter because if the
government proves that a single item on a return is fraudulent, the presumption is that everything on
the return is fraudulent. Thus, the 1986 burden shift greatly changed the playing field for taxpayers.
See generally SALTZMAN, supra note 176, 7B.01[I].
183. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965).
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correct the noncompliance, error, or omission. 4 Thus, the attorney is
obligated to inform the client of the noncompliance, error, or omission,
and should advise the client of the consequences of committing tax fraud.
So far, the duty of the attorney and the interest of the client are in
harmony.
The decision to file an initial return or an amended return, however,
is solely the client's, and in order to make an informed decision, the
attorney must point out to the client all the pros and cons of filing such
a return. The problem is that, after careful consideration of the pros and
cons, the attorney may decide that it is not in the client's best interest to
file such a return. To illustrate the problem, we must examine the
considerations inherent in advising a client to file a correct (or corrected)
return.
One problem is the statute of limitations, which is unlimited in fraud.8 5
Thus, if the usual three-year statutory period for assessment has expired,
the government has an incentive to allege fraud. A concern of the
attorney is whether the unlimited statute of limitations can be limited by
the filing of an honest, amended return-and that depends upon the type
of fraud involved. There are two general categories of tax fraud:
fraudulent failure to file a return and fraud in the return itself.
In the case of a fraudulent failure to file,"8 6 the subsequent filing of a
nonfraudulent return will start the running of the three-year statute of
184. See id. Note that there is no such duty to advise the client to correct the misrepresentation
under Circular 230. Instead, if the attorney discovers an error, omission or noncompliance on any
document submitted to the IRS, the attorney must advise the client of the error, omission or
noncompliance. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1998).
185. See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1) (1994). There is also no statute of limitations if no return is filed.
Thus, the tax liability, plus penalties and interest, may be assessed at any time without a time bar.
See supra note 135 (discussing the various statutes of limitation). In addition, there is a six-year
statute of limitations for criminal fraud prosecutions. See I.R.C. § 6531 (1994). This period runs
from the time of the commission of the offense and is suspended during any time the individual to
be charged is outside the United States or is a fugitive from justice. See id. A criminal action is
commenced when an indictment is returned by a grand jury or an information is filed with the court.
The tax-related offenses under the Criminal Code (Title 18) are subject to a five-year statute of
limitations, with the exception of conspiracy, which has a six-year limitations period. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3282 (1994).
186. The failure to file a return may constitute fraud if the failure to file is intentional and is
done for the purpose of evading a tax liability. See I.R.C. § 7203 (1994) (imposing penalty for
willful failure to file a return when required to do so). In this situation, the taxpayer has a legal
obligation to file a return. See I.R.C. § 6012 (1994) (stating that any individual with gross income
equal to or greater than the exemption amount plus the standard deduction is required to file a
return).
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limitations on assessment. 87 But when a fraudulent return has been filed,
the unlimited statute of limitations in fraud cases cannot be shortened by
subsequently filing a nonfraudulent amended return, 8 nor does filing an
honest amended return preclude a fraud prosecution. 9 The rationale is
that a taxpayer has no legal obligation to file an amended return, just as
there is no legal obligation on the part of the government to accept one; 90
rather, it is a matter of administrative grace and convenience of the
government.' 9 ' Thus, the amended return relates back to the original
return, but as far as the statute of limitations is concerned, the fraud
cannot be purged, and the amended return will have no effect on the
unlimited statutory assessment period.
But by filing such a return, the client may be placing himself in
jeopardy of a criminal prosecution for tax evasion, because the amended
return may highlight the potential fraud and constitute an admission that
a false original return was filed.' 92 If the taxpayer does not file an
amended return to correct the original false return, the chances of the
false return being detected generally are not great because less than two
percent of individual returns are audited.'93 Thus, the attorney, in
adequately representing the client, should inform the client of the slim
chance of a tax audit (and thus of discovery), but the attorney also must
be careful not to use the audit lottery to justify the client's illegal
187. See Bennett v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 114 (1958) (stating that three-year assessment applies
after nonfraudulent return is filed); Rev. Rul. 79-178, 1979-1 C.B. 435 (stating that once a
nonfraudulent return is filed, I.R.C. § 6501(c) no longer applies and tax must be assessed within the
three-year period under I.R.C. § 6501(a)).
188. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 387 (1984) (stating that amended return has
no effect whatsoever on the statute of limitations); see also Zellerbach Paper Co. v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 172, 180 (1934) (stating that the amended return relates back to the original return and the
statute of limitations is determined by the filing of the original return).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, No. 96-1186, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 23943, at * 12-13
(6th Cir. Sept. 9, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (affirming prosecution for evasion after taxpayer filed
amended return); United States v. Dana, 457 F.2d 205, 210 (7th Cir. 1972) (affirming conviction for
tax evasion after taxpayer voluntarily filed an amended return).
190. There is no statutory provision authorizing the filing of an amended return. Such returns
are a matter of IRS administrative grace. See Badaracco, 464 U.S. at 397 ("[The Internal Revenue
Code does not explicitly provide either for a taxpayer's filing, or for the Commissioner's acceptance,
of an amended return; instead, an amended return is a creature of administrative origin and grace.");
see also MICHAEL MULRONEY, FEDERAL TAX EXAMINATIONS MANUAL § 2.8 (1985).
191. See Badarracco, 464 U.S. at 397. The Supreme Court's opinion is based on the Treasury
Regulations. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (as amended in 1993) (stating that taxpayer should amend
return and pay additional tax due if, within limitations period the taxpayer discovers that an item was
omitted from gross income in a prior taxable year); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 (a)(3) (as amended in 1994)
(stating the same obligation with respect to liability improperly taken into account in prior taxable
year).
192. See SALTZMAN, supra note 176, 5.02[2].
193. See supra note 33.
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position. 94 Supposedly, an amended return does not increase the audit
potential,'" but if the government suspects that a discrepancy between the
original return and the amended return might indicate fraud on the
original return, this will almost certainly increase the risk of an audit.
An argument in favor of filing an amended return is that if an honest
amended return is not filed, the fraud may taint other taxable years and
other returns, thus increasing the risk that the original fraud may be
detected.'96 Thus, the filing of an initial return, whether honest or
fraudulent, in one of those subsequent years may constitute a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the taxpayer for fraudulent acts in
the prior years. In this situation, the taxpayer is truly faced with a
dilemma because the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion does not permit the taxpayer to avoid filing the initial return.
Instead, the privilege must be validly claimed on a properly filed
return.' But if the client is under investigation for tax evasion, and the
filing of a return would constitute the last link in the chain of evidence
needed to prosecute the client, the attorney may decide that it is in the
client's best interest not to file the return,' or in the alternative, to file
194. This would be a violation of Circular 230. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b) (1998) (stating that
a willful violation of the realistic possibility standard, which provides that advice cannot be
predicated on audit potential, will subject a practitioner to suspension or disbarment from practice
before the IRS).
195. See MuLRoNEY, supra note 190, § 2.8, at 85 (noting that instead, such returns are treated
as a timely filed return, provided the original return was timely filed).
196. Moreover, if the subsequent returns are considered fraudulent because of the taint of the
earlier fraud, the taxpayer also may be prosecuted for those acts of evasion as well. See United
States v. Shorter, 608 F. Supp. 871, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("An act constituting evasion ... brings
the prosecution within the statute of limitations even if the taxes being evaded were due and payable
prior thereto.").
197. See infra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
198. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). Hoffman held that return
information does not necessarily have to lead to a criminal conviction. See id. Rather, the privilege
against self-incrimination is validly claimed if the information that would be revealed in the return
would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime,"
Id. It also has been held that the link does not have to be strong enough to support a criminal
conviction. See United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 1980); Hashagen v. United
States, 283 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1960). It is sufficient if it would supply merely a "lead or a
clue." Neff, 615 F.2d at 1239; Hashagen, 283 F.2d at 348.
The situation of an attorney advising a client not to file an initial return is not addressed by
Circular 230, although it recently has been considered an actionable offense. See Sheryl Stratton,
Talking to IRS Agents and Advising Clients Not to File, 80 TAX NOTES 657, 658 (1998) (reporting
remarks of Michael 1. Saltzman that the ostensible amendment has not been clearly thought through).
Yet an attorney may recommend that a client not file if the client is under investigation for tax
evasion and the filing of the return would constitute the last link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the taxpayer. See Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
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a return omitting the required financial and tax information and asserting
a wholesale claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege."9
Another important consideration is that the filing of any tax return,
whether an initial return or an amended one, may waive the attorney-
client privilege, not only with respect to the data transmitted in the return
itself, but also with respect to the information underlying the data.2"' For
example, it has been held that the listing of income on a return waives
the attorney-client privilege as to the source of the income."' It has also
been held generally that client identity and fee information fall outside
the scope of the attorney-client privilege because that is not typically part
of the confidential communication from the client.20 2
199. In general, such a return does not constitute a return and the exercise of the privilege is not
a valid one. See Neff, 615 F.2d at 1238 (citing courts that have recognized this principle and rejected
it in favor of the independent Fifth Amendment analysis). Such a return, however, may constitute
a valid exercise of the privilege if the defendant is faced with a "substantial hazard of self-
incrimination"; that is, "'real and appreciable' and not merely 'imaginary and unsubstantial [sic],'
when the defendant has "'reasonable cause to apprehend [such] danger from a direct answer' to
questions posed to him," and the information revealed in the direct answer would "furnish a link in
the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime." Id. at 1239 (citations
omitted). Note, however, that when the crime is a tax crime, such as fraudulently claiming excess
withholding exemptions, the Fifth Amendment does not prevent compelled self-incrimination. See
United States v. Carlson, 617 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1980).
200. See, e.g., United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 579 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that
disclosure of estate tax information on a return effectively waives the attorney-client privilege);
United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that attorney-client privilege
was waived, not only as to the transmitted data, but also as to the details underlying that data). See
infra notes 218-44 and accompanying text (discussing in detail the attorney-client privilege).
201. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Glen J. Schroeder, Jr., 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11 th Cir.
1987) (ordering that the source of income be revealed in prosecution for tax evasion because no
attorney-client privilege applied).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 504-05 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding client identifying information not privileged); Holifield v. United States, 909 F.2d 201, 204
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding fee information not privileged); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding billing records generally discoverable); United States v. Dickinson, 308 F.
Supp. 900, 901 (D. Ariz. 1969) (holding fees paid and means of payment discoverable), affdper
curiam, 421 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970).
Even when there may have been an expectation of privacy, cash transactions of more than
$10,000 are strictly subject to the disclosure and recordkeeping requirements of I.R.C. § 60501, which
requires any person engaged in a trade or business who receives more than $10,000 in cash in a
single transaction or in a series of related transactions to report to the government the payment and
the identification of the payor-name, address, and taxpayer identification number. See I.R.C. §
60501(a) (1994). Failure to adhere to this requirement will subject the person to civil and criminal
penalties for "intentional disregard" of I.R.C. § 60501. See I.R.C. § 6721(e)(2)(C) (1994) (providing
for civil penalty equal to the greater of $25,000 or amount of cash received in the transaction up to
$100,000); I.R.C. § 7203 (1994) (providing that failure to comply with I.R.C. § 60501 is punishable
as a misdemeanor).
Objections raising Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims and the attorney-client privilege have not
been successful. See, e.g., United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 1876-78 (8th Cir. 1995); In re
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The attorney-client privilege also does not protect communications
made in furtherance of a crime or fraud.2"3 This exception generally
applies once-the government establishes a prima facie case of tax evasion,
and the exception may apply even though the attorney may not have
known at the time that the client was engaged in tax evasion activities.20 4
Thus, an attorney can be compelled to testify against the client as to the
source of income revealed in connection with other legal services
rendered.
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege can cut both
ways in determining whether it is in the client's best interest to file an
amended return. On the one hand, it may be argued that if the original
return is fraudulent, there is no attorney-client privilege. Thus, the issue
of privilege should not be of concern to the client in deciding whether to
file an amended return. On the other hand, the government bears the
burden of proving fraud and until that burden is met, the attorney-client
privilege presumably applies. If the client files an amended return and
highlights the fraud, the government's job of proving fraud becomes that
much easier and the deck is then stacked against the taxpayer-no statute
of limitations, the original fraudulent return is highlighted, the amended
return may constitute an admission against the taxpayer, and the attorney-
client privilege may not apply. The only point in favor of filing an
amended return is that if the client voluntarily does so, without threat of
prosecution, the government might be more inclined to believe that the
misrepresentation in the original return was attributable to innocent
error.20 5 If not, at least a court or jury, or both, may be more sympathetic
to the taxpayer if the taxpayer acted voluntarily.
Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9 (MIA), 899 F.2d 1039, 1042-44 (1 lth Cir. 1990). The only exception
to the disclosure requirement has been when anonymity of the client was part of the reason the client
sought the attorney's services or when disclosure would provide the last link in proving guilt. See
Goldberger & Dubin, 935 F.2d at 505 (recognizing legal advice exception); Baird v. Koerner, 279
F.2d 623, 631-33 (9th Cir. 1960) (establishing last link exception). Many jurisdictions, however, do
not recognize these exceptions, and those that do apply it only rarely. See, e.g., Lefcourt v. United
States, 125 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting these exceptions), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341
(1998).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989); United States v. Hodge, 548
F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977).
204. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1227-29 (compelling attorney to testify
against client in tax evasion prosecution even though attorney had no knowledge of evasion at time
legal services were rendered).
205. Of course, this depends upon the type of error, misrepresentation or omission. Some carry
more credibility than others. The IRS currently recognizes four general categories of tax evasion:
(1) understatement or omissions of income; (2) claiming fictitious or improper deductions; (3) false
allocation of income; and (4) improper claims for credit or exemptions. See IRS MANUAL
HANDBOOK 4231 (1981). Obviously, the more egregious the error, misrepresentation, or omission,
the less credible it will be as an innocent error.
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After digesting these points, plus additional information on the civil
and criminal fraud penalties, the client may decide against filing the
amended return. What happens then? At this point, the attorney has
presented the myriad considerations to the client, the client has made an
informed decision, and the attorney's legal duty is technically done. Now
the attorney must consider her ethical obligations, not only to her client,
but also to the government. But these obligations may conflict, depend-
ing on the attorney's initial role and the circumstances of the fraud.
The attorney's primary consideration is to avoid being a party to the
fraud.20 6 This could result both in the loss of her license to practice law
and in her disbarment from practicing before the IRS. There are two
general ways in which an attorney may be considered a party to the
fraud. First, when she is perceived to be counseling the client to commit
tax fraud, or to conceal the fact of the fraud.2"7 Second, when the
attorney has knowledge of the fraud, continues to represent the client, and
subsequently gives false or fraudulent information to a third party.
An attorney representing a client in tax matters may assume several
roles: (1) return preparer, (2) planner and advisor, and (3) advocate in
litigation and at audit. If the attorney unwittingly prepared the fraudulent
return, or the fraud is likely to affect other taxable years, the attorney
must withdraw from further representation of the client if the client
refuses to file an amended return, in order to avoid perpetrating the
fraud.2"' In such a case, the ABA permits the attorney to make a "noisy
withdrawal., 29  But this withdrawal must be undertaken carefully so as
not to disclose any client confidences or otherwise prejudice the interests
206. Not surprisingly, such conduct is prohibited under both the Model Rules and Circular 230.
See 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(b) (1998) (disseminating or participating in the dissemination of false or
misleading information constitutes disreputable conduct); 31 C.F.R. § 10.51(j) (1998) (defining false
opinion as including "counseling or assisting in conduct known to be illegal or fraudulent"); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1(b) (1997) (stating that an attorney must not fail to
disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting in a criminal
or fraudulent act by a client).
207. A common defense in tax evasion cases is to blame the attorney or advisor in order to
establish that the conduct in question is not intentional on the part of the accused. Therefore, the
attorney should be particularly cautious when dealing with a client who has demonstrated a
propensity to commit a crime.
208. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(i) (1997) (stating that if the
lawyer's continued representation of a client would result in a violation of the rules of ethics or law,
the lawyer must withdraw from representing the client); id. Rule 1.2 cmt (stating that when the
lawyer is representing client in activity lawyer ultimately discovers is criminal or fraudulent, lawyer
must withdraw from representation).
209. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992),
reprinted in Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1001:134 (Aug. 8, 1992).
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of the client."' Such a balance makes the withdrawal extremely difficult
because any withdrawal by the attorney is likely to trigger suspicion,
thereby prejudicing the interests of the client.
If the attorney did not prepare the fraudulent return, or the fraud will
not affect other taxable years, the attorney may continue to represent the
client. If so, the attorney may find herself in a conflict of interest. One
way in which a conflict may arise is through an audit of the client's tax
return(s). It is common practice at the conclusion of an audit for the
revenue agent to inquire whether the taxpayer's representative has
knowledge of any item on the return in question or on any open returns
that require adjustment. The attorney will then be trapped because
deliberate misrepresentation is a violation of Circular 230.2'" Conversely,
revealing a client confidence without that client's permission is a
violation of the Model Rules. 2 In recognition of this dilemma, the ABA
requires the attorney to advise the revenue agent that she is not in a
position to answer that question." 3 Because this is the standard answer,
it will immediately raise red flags that something may be amiss,
particularly if the attorney prepared the return or any prior returns, and
would otherwise be in a position to answer.
Another troublesome issue for the attorney is whether the client can be
trusted. If the client is unwilling to file an amended return, by definition
that client has demonstrated a willingness to commit a federal crime. In
tax practice, an attorney is entitled to rely on information furnished by a
client without having to verify the accuracy of every piece of information
the client furnishes, unless the attorney has reason to question that
information.21 4 Once a client demonstrates a willingness to commit tax
fraud, however, the attorney's duty of inquiry becomes much greater.2 5
Stated differently, the attorney's liability for failure to inquire becomes
much greater.
210. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-375 (1993),
reprinted in Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 1001:192 (Aug. 6, 1993). Because of the
obvious conflict with the duty of confidentiality, Formal Opinion 92-366 was narrowed the following
year.
211. See supra note 126.
212. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1997).
213. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 cmt. (1965).
214. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(3) (1998).
215. See id. (stating that the practitioner may not ignore the implications of information known
to her and must make reasonable inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect,
inconsistent, or incomplete).
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III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE PREPARATION OF
INCOME TAx RETURNS
Lawyers engaged in the general practice of law, particularly those
practicing in small towns, frequently fill out income tax returns for
clients. A taxpayer has the option of preparing his own return, or
enlisting the aid of a professional such as an attorney, a CPA, or a
commercial tax preparation service. Generally, when the taxpayer
chooses a lawyer, it is because he has complicated transactions 'that
require sophisticated advice, or he anticipates a problem with the
government at some point. The taxpayer may feel more comfortable with
a lawyer who can give him legal advice and represent him at every stage
of any potential conflict. Another consideration is that the taxpayer may
have established a previous relationship with that lawyer, and the lawyer
is now familiar with the taxpayer's financial transactions. Thus, the
taxpayer may not want to establish a new relationship with someone else.
Most taxpayers, regardless of the category in which they fall, have
probably assumed that their communications are protected from disclosure
by the attorney, and that the lawyer's notes, memoranda, and work papers
are similarly beyond the reach of a summons or a subpoena. That,
however, may not be the case.
Confidentiality of information in the representation of a client is
derived from two sources: the state ethical codes and the attorney-client
privilege. The attorney-client privilege shields private communications
between an attorney and a client, but it is a very limited privilege." 6 The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure so
that the attorney may fully and completely represent the client." 7
Therefore, in order for the privilege to apply, the communication must
have been made to the attorney in her capacity as legal advisor, advocate,
or in some other role in which the attorney functions strictly as an
attorney, and the communication must have been made with the intent
that it remain confidential.2"8 A mere attorney-client relationship does not
make every communication between an attorney and a client confidential.
216. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. (1997).
217. See id.
218. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). It is thus advisable at the outset to
properly document the agreement between the attorney and the client with a contemporaneous
engagement letter, specifying the role to be played by the attorney. See Ronald A. Stein, Preserving
Client Confidences and Work Product Privacy, 72 TAx NOTES 1287, 1300 (1996). Such an
engagement letter is also advisable with respect to any other professional the attorney may hire or
recommend that the client hire to assist the attorney with the rendering of legal advice. See id.
[Vol. 47
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Thus, the government routinely advises its agents that the attorney-client
privilege must be narrowly construed.2"9
"If the attorney's role is that of a mere scrivener or conduit for
handling funds," or the advice relates to a business matter, as opposed to
a legal matter, or "the transaction involves a simple transfer of title to
real estate, without legal advice, communications from the client to the
attorney are not privileged.""22 Because the privilege applies only to
attorneys, the government historically has taken the position - that
communications made to a person who acts as both attorney and
accountant are not privileged if the communications have been made
"solely to enable the attorney to audit the client's books, prepare a federal
income tax return, or otherwise act purely as an accountant. '22' The
rationale behind the government's position has been that the privilege
results in the "withholding of relevant information from the factfinder,
[thus it should be applied] only where necessary to achieve its pur-
pose., 2 2  Since there was historically no federal accountant-client
privilege, communications between taxpayers and accountants, with
respect to federal tax returns, were not privileged. Thus, communications
between client and attorney also were not privileged when the attorney
acted as an accountant. Recently, however, Congress has granted a
privilege to nonlawyers who are authorized to practice before the IRS.223
But the newly enacted privilege has some severe limitations and many
unresolved issues remain.
-A. The Tax Practitioner Privilege
The privilege applies to "federally authorized tax practitioners,"224 to
the extent that such practitioners render tax advice to clients in connection
219. See Bruce Graves, Attorney Client Privilege in Preparation of Income Tax Returns: What
Every Attorney-Preparer Should Know, 42 TAx LAw. 577, 578-79 (1989) (quoting Internal Revenue
Manual, MT 9781-30, § 344.2, Jan. 18, 1980).
220. Id. at 579 (citing Internal Revenue Manual, MT 9781-30, § 344.2, Jan. 18, 1980 (citing
Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 806 (9th Cir. 1961))).
221. Graves, supra note 219, at 579. But a privileged communication can occur between an
attorney and an accountant, or between the client and an accountant or other consultant, provided that
the accountant or consultant is acting at the direction of the attorney to facilitate the rendering of
legal advice to the client. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
222. Fisher, 425 U.S. at 403.
223. See i.R.C. § 7525 (1994). The underlying rationale is perhaps best characterized by Stein:
"[W]ithholding the confidentiality privilege from communications involving selected members of the
approved group would be virtually certain to subvert the congressional purpose by penalizing parties
who unwittingly call upon the wrong professional." Stein, supra note 218, at 1292.
224. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1). A federally authorized tax practitioner is any individual who is
authorized under federal law to practice before the IRS. See id. § 7525(a)(3)(A); see also supra note
7 (listing such individuals).
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with civil tax matters (except tax shelters)225 before the IRS or in federal
court proceedings.226 Because the privilege applies only to the extent that
the communication would have been privileged under the federal common
law if made between an attorney and a client,227 advice with respect to
return preparation generally is not privileged because such advice would
not be privileged under the common law if rendered by a lawyer.228 This
has been the prevailing view among the courts, regardless of the rationale
of the client in choosing an attorney to prepare his tax returns, and
regardless of the complexity of the return or the expertise required to
prepare it. The underlying rationale divides along two lines. First, the
privilege applies only to legal advice, and because the preparation of tax
returns is considered an accounting (rather than a legal) service, the
privilege does not apply.229 Second, communications that are disclosed
or intended to be disclosed to third parties lose the benefit of the
privilege. Because return information is intended to be transmitted to the
government, the privilege is waived with respect to that information.23°
There are two general problems that must be resolved before the full
scope of the privilege can be determined. First, there exists the problem
of distinguishing tax advice subject to the privilege from advice that is
not privileged, such as return preparation advice, business advice, and
225. See I.R.C. § 7525(b).
226. See id. § 7525(a)(2).
227. See id. § 7525(a)(1).
228. The Second Circuit, however, takes a different approach. See Colton v. United States, 306
F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962) ("There can, of course, be no question that the giving of tax advice and
the preparation of tax returns . . . are basically matters sufficiently within the professional
competence of an attorney to make them prima facje subject to the attorney-client privilege."); United
States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (extending privilege to accountant who worked
closely with the attorney).
229. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Glen J. Schroeder, Jr., 842 F.2d 1223, 1224-25
(11 th Cir. 1987) ("[A] taxpayer should not be able to invoke a privilege simply because he hires an
attorney to prepare his tax return."); United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that preparation of tax returns by an attorney is not a legal service); United States v.
Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 299 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that consultations, even with an attorney, in the
preparation of tax returns are not privileged); see also Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857
(8th Cir. 1966) (holding no attorney-client relationship established in connection with the preparation
of tax returns, which the court regarded as the work of a "mere scrivener"). But see United States
v. Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490, 492 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) (stating that attomey-client privilege is applicable
to return preparation advice as long as it remains confidential); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d
460, 462 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding the attorney-client privilege can apply to communications between
attorney and accountant if the communication enables the attorney to render legal advice).
230. See Dorokee Co. v. United States, 697 F.2d 277, 280 (10th Cir. 1983) ("Even those courts
holding that the attorney-client privilege can arise from the preparation of income tax returns do not
apply the privilege to documents given by a client to an attorney for inclusion in the client's income
tax return, because such information is obviously not intended to remain confidential.").
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advice with respect to an accountant's audit role."' A particular problem
for attorneys is whether the analysis of aggressive return positions with
respect to the realistic possibility standard constitutes legal advice or
accounting advice.232 A related problem is that if the taxpayer has to
establish that his actions with respect to the aggressive position were
reasonable in order to avoid a negligence penalty, an advice-of-counsel
defense may impliedly waive the privilege.233
Second, courts are split on the extent to which the privilege is waived
with respect to documents or other supporting data underlying the
information in the return. Under one approach, the waiver applies only
to the data ultimately sent to the government. Thus, peripheral
communications between the client and the attorney-preparer remain
privileged.234 Another approach is that, in filing a return, the taxpayer
has disclosed, at least in part, the substance of the confidential communi-
cations with the preparer and therefore waives any privilege as to details
underlying the reported data.235 A third approach takes the middle
23 1. Typically, the privilege has applied only to communications between a lawyer and client
regarding legal advice. Since accountants and nonlawyers are not licensed to practice law, the
question may be raised as to whether the newly enacted privilege applies to nonlawyers at all. Such
practitioners, however, may represent clients before the Tax Court because this authority has been
specifically bestowed by the government. See supra note 7. Therefore, legal advice rendered by
nonlawyers with respect to representation of clients before the IRS and the Tax Court may be
privileged. Note, however, that the privilege does not apply to criminal tax matters or to
communications made with respect to nontax matters pending before other government agencies. See
Barton Massey, Practitioners Spell Out What CPA-Client Privilege Won't Do, 79 TAX NoTES 140 1,
1401 (1998) (stating that the privilege does not apply to private party litigation, state communications
unless subject to a state-enacted accountant-client privilege, and "communications made directly to
nonfederally authorized practitioners").
232. The Fifth Circuit, which had previously held that preparation of tax returns by attorneys was
an accounting function to which the privilege did not apply, see United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d
1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981), subsequently held that a lawyer's analysis of "soft spots" in a return
could constitute legal advice. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).
233. See United States v. Miller, 600 F.2d 498, 501-02 (5th Cir. 1979).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177, 179 (D. Neb. 1970) ("[A] more
realistic rule would be that the client intends that only as much of the information will be conveyed
to the government as the attorney concludes should be, and ultimately is, sent to the government.");
United States v. Jeremiah, 76-1 T.C. 84,181, 84,183 (1975) ("[The] government gains nothing by
selective disclosure of information it already has anyway.").
235. See, e.g., United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding waiver applied
not only to information included in the return but to the underlying data as well); United States v.
Merrell, 303 F. Supp. 490,492 (N.D.N.Y. 1969) ("[The] attorney-client privilege protects only those
papers or communications prepared by the client for confidential communication to the attorney, or
by the attorney to record confidential communications."). This view has been criticized because it
disregards the purpose of the privilege to encourage full and free disclosure of information by the
client to the attorney. If the client thinks that all information transmitted to the attorney would be
potentially unprivileged, the client would be reluctant to give the information to the attorney. See
Graves, supra note 219, at 592 (quoting United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970)).
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ground, initially assuming the information to be privileged, but if an item
on the return is challenged by the IRS, the taxpayer must then choose
between waiving the privilege and supporting the item in refute of the
IRS's challenge, or asserting the privilege, conceding the challenge, and
perhaps incurring a penalty as a result.2" 6 There are two problems with
the latter approach. First, when the source of income is at issue, the
government may find itself frustrated. Second, it is currently unclear
what the effect will be of the recently enacted shift in the burden of proof
to the IRS. 37 Currently, the government takes the position that the only
prevailing privilege that applies in this situation is the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. But the Fifth Amendment privilege
applies only in criminal cases and it does not excuse the taxpayer from
filing a tax return."' Thus, the Fifth Amendment privilege is valid only
if claimed on the return itself.2 9 If the taxpayer incriminates himself on
the return, the privilege is waived not only because the information is
considered voluntarily disclosed,240 but also because the privilege does not
apply to communications made in furtherance of a crime or fraud. When
the government makes a prima facie case of tax evasion by independent
evidence, the attorney's advice related to the criminal activity is not
considered privileged.24 Because the privilege must be asserted on an
item-by-item basis, however, an in camera inspection of each document
in question is often necessary to determine which documents, if any, are
privileged. 2
Another problematic argument, which has been sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court
in a nontax context, is that records required by law to be maintained pursuant to a valid regulatory
purpose are "public records" which fall outside the Fifth Amendment privilege. See United States
v. Shapiro, 335 U.S. 1, 32-34 (1947) (dealing with wartime regulations promulgated under the
Emergency Price Control Act).
236. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated March 24, 1983, 566 F. Supp. 883, 884 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) ("[B]y the mere filing of a tax return, the taxpayer does not agree to disclose to all comers the
documentation underlying the deductions claimed.").
237. See supra note 182.
238. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927) (holding that the filing
requirement alone does not compel testimony).
239. See id. (holding that taxpayer was not excused from filing a tax return but could abstain
from including incriminating items on the return). The problem is that the taxpayer may be subject
to liability when the Fifth Amendment privilege is exercised if the privilege is claimed erroneously.
The government may then prosecute the taxpayer under I.R.C. § 7203 for willful failure to file a tax
return, unless the taxpayer can establish that he acted in good faith. See Garner v. United States, 424
U.S. 648, 649 (1976) (allowing a defendant's tax returns to be used against him in a nontax criminal
prosecution).
240. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 665 (holding that the requirement to file a tax return does not
constitute compelled self-incrimination, thus voluntarily disclosing information effectively waives the
privilege).
241. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 574-75 (1989).
242. See id.
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The privilege also does not apply generally to the client's identity, the
attorney's billing statements, the fees paid by the client, and the manner
of payment; nor is such information protected from disclosure by the
First, Fifth or Sixth Amendments.243 Thus, an attorney may be compelled
to disclose such information.244
B. Work Product Doctrine
A doctrine related to the attorney-client privilege is the work product
doctrine. It provides that the discovery of documents and tangible items
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial are not discoverable by
the opposing party or that party's representative unless the party makes
a showing that there is a substantial need of the documents or items in
the preparation of the party's case, and that the party is unable to obtain
the substantial equivalent by any other means without undue hardship.2 4
The work product doctrine, like the attorney-client privilege, also
encourages candor between a client and an attorney. The primary
purpose of the doctrine, however, is to "preserve the integrity of the
243. If an attorney receives more than $10,000 in cash in a single transaction from a client, the
attorney is required to file a Form 8300 with the government, providing the client's name, address,
taxpayer identification number, and the amount of cash received. See supra note 202. Courts
generally have been unsympathetic to claims of attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Lefcourt v.
United States, 125 F.3d 79, 88 (2d. Cir. 1997) ("Although the contours of the special circumstance
exception have not been exhaustively developed, no doubt due to the fact special circumstances are
seldom found to exist, it is clear that there is no special circumstance in this circuit simply because
the provision of client-identifying information could prejudice the client in the case for which legal
fees are paid."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2341 (1998); United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877-75
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Sixth Amendment does not protect compelled disclosure because
a client may use alternative forms of payment and avoid disclosure, that the Fith Amendment
protection does not apply because the privilege belongs only to the individual holding the privilege,
and that the First Amendment does not apply because the attorney is only compelled to disclose
information the client has given voluntarily). But see United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C.,
935 F.2d 501, 505 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the attorney-client privilege might shield the client's
identity from governmentally compelled disclosure in certain "special circumstances"); United States
v. Gertner, 873 F. Supp. 729 (D. Mass. 1995). For a brief discussion of these "special circumstanc-
es," see Sindel, 53 F.3d at 876 (listing the three "special circumstances" exceptions: legal advice,
last link, and confidential communications). Note that not all jurisdictions recognize these particular
special circumstances. See Lefcourt, 125 F.3d at 87 (rejecting an exception for incrimination of the
client).
Note also that the Form 8300 contains a question as to whether the cash payment represents a
"suspicious transaction." The court in Sindel rejected the constitutionality of such a provision, which
effectively compels the attorney to "act as an agent for the government" against her client. Sindel,
53 F.3d at 877.
244. See Lefcourt, 125 F.3d at 83 (affirming the imposition of a $25,000 fine on an attorney for
failing to comply with IRS filing requirements).
245. This doctrine is codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.. See FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3).
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adversarial system of justice"246 by preventing the opposing party from
profiting from the "mental impressions, legal theories or documents"
prepared in anticipation of litigation by advisors for the other party.24 7
It also provides a zone of privacy for the attorney to develop legal
theories and litigation strategy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
adversaries.24 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, however, the work
product doctrine has historically applied to nonlawyers as well as lawyers,
for the doctrine insulates materials developed by consultants and other
professionals working directly for the client.
The doctrine applies to two different types of materials: (1) opinion
work product-mental impressions, legal theories and opinions; and (2)
fact work product-tangible materials such as documents prepared in
anticipation of litigation. Opinion work product has a much stronger
protection than does fact work product. While courts are divided on the
issue of whether the protection accorded opinion work product is
qualified or absolute, 49 there is agreement that the burden of proving
necessity and unavailability is a much heavier one when opinion work
product is at issue.250
The privilege accorded fact work product is qualified by two general
exceptions. First, documents that would have been created in essentially
similar form irrespective of litigation do not receive work product
protection. Second, the doctrine does not apply to documents prepared
in the ordinary course of business, even if litigation had commenced at
the time the documents were prepared.25" ' Thus, it has been held that
materials assembled in the ordinary course of preparing an income tax
246. Stein, supra note 218, at 1301.
247. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). The work product doctrine protects
"interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other tangible and intangible ways" the attorney or any other professional represents the
client in litigation or aids the attorney in such representation. Id.
248. See id. at 510-11.
249. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (extending
absolute protection to opinion work product). But cf In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224,
1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that the privilege is not absolute but is discoverable only in a "rare
situation").
250. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981) ("While we are not prepared
at this juncture to say that such material is always protected by the work-product rule, we think a far
stronger showing of necessity and unavailability ... would be necessary to compel disclosure.").
251. See Bemardo v. United States, 104 T.C. 408, 415 (1995) ("To show that a document was
prepared in anticipation of litigation '[a] litigant must demonstrate that documents were created "with
a special claim supported by concrete facts which would likely lead to [the] litigation in mind," not
merely assembled in the ordinary course of business or for other nonlitigation purposes'), (quoting
Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5 F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (quoting Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir.
1980))).
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return are discoverable."' It has also been held that IRS summons are
subject to the traditional privileges and limitations,2" including work
product. 4
In order to invoke the doctrine, however, there must be some causal
nexus between the document at issue and the litigation.2" The question
is how substantial and imminent the threat of litigation must be to justify
immunity. There is currently a split among the courts on this issue. The
Tax Court has held that at the time the documents were prepared, the
prospect of litigation must have been "more than a remote possibility. 256
But the Second Circuit has more recently used a less demanding test,
holding that when a "document is created because of the prospect of
litigation" it does not lose work product protection "merely because it is
created in order to assist with a business decision. 25 7  Thus, a pre-
transaction document may be covered under the work product doctrine. 2",
It is worth noting, however, that in the case before the Second Circuit,
the prospect of litigation was very likely. The client had been under
close and continuous scrutiny by the IRS for the past thirty years, the
transaction in question was creative and unprecedented, and the refund in
question was large enough to trigger review by the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation.259 Because of these factors, the chance of audit
was much greater than usual. The Fifth Circuit has held that if the
document is prepared in anticipation of dealing with the IRS, it may well
have been prepared in anticipation of an administrative dispute, and this
may constitute "litigation" within the purview of the doctrine.260
Commentators have noted that while foreseeability of litigation provides
an objective guideline for determining whether the document was
prepared with litigation in mind, the better test, nevertheless, involves a
consideration of subjective and objective evidence in determining the
purpose for which the document was created.261 Whether litigation is
252. See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).
253. See United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 712 (1980).
254. See Upjohn Co.v. United States, 449 U.S. at 398-99.
255. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (2d ed.
1994).
256. United States v. Bell, 95-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 50,006 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 1994).
257. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
258. Thus, the AdIman court held that a document may be prepared for litigation even though
"based on actions or events that had not yet occurred at the time of creation." Id. at 1196.
259. Refunds of over $1 million must be approved by the Joint Committee on Taxation. See id.
(citing 26 U.S.C.A. § 6405(a) (1994)). The anticipated refund in Adiman was around $35 million.
See id.
260. United States v. Hodges, Grant & Kaufmann, 768 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1985).
261. See Stein, supra note 218, at 1303-04; see also 8 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 255, § 2024.
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imminent should be a factor, but not the decisive factor, because, as it has
been noted, "prudent businessmen plan for litigation risks."262
IV. TAXPAYER CONFIDENCES AND THE GOVERNMENT
On the other side of the coin, to what extent is the government
required to preserve the confidences of the taxpayer? By law, tax return
information is confidential and may not be revealed by the government
except in very narrow, enumerated circumstances. 263 But the extent of
this protection is currently unclear because there are several important
issues which remain unresolved.2 64  Among them is the extent to which
the IRS can publicly release information elicited at trial. There is no
statutorily enumerated exception that would allow such information to be
released. But the government's view is that return information loses
statutory protection as a result of prior disclosure in a judicial proceeding
because this information is a part of the public record, and the taxpayer
can have no expectation of privacy once the matter has been raised in
court. Thus, according to the government, this information constitutes an
unenumerated statutory exception.26
The problems inherent in this view are most poignantly illustrated by
the case of Johnson v. Sawyer, 66 which had its genesis in the late 1970s,
262. See Stein, supra note 218, at 1304.
263. See I.R.C. § 6103 (1994). This section provides: "Returns and return information shall
be confidential, and except as authorized by this title[,] no officer or employee of the United States
•.. shall disclose any return or return information obtained by him in any manner in connection with
his service as such an officer or an employee ... ." Id. "Return information" is defined in I.R.C.
§ 6103 (b)(2)(A). It broadly encompasses "any informatiod gathered by the IRS regarding a person's
tax liability." Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (citing Dowd v.
Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 438 (D.D.C. 1984)).
264. See generally Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal
Revenue Code Provisions to Redress UnauthorizedDisclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information,
23 SEToN HALL L. REv. 924 (1993),
265. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1997); Lampert v. United
States, 854 F.2d 335, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1988).
266. 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997). This case has had a tortuous history. Mr. Johnson initially
filed suit in the federal district court in 1983, against the IRS employees involved in the media
release. See id. at 1313. His initial complaint requested damages for wrongful disclosure of return
information in violation of I.R.C. § 6103. See id. Later in 1983, Mr. Johnson amended his
complaint to add a claim against the United States in violation of the Federal Tort Claims Recovery
Act for negligent supervision. See id. at 1314. The defendants then moved for either dismissal or
summary judgment. See id. These motions were denied without a written opinion. See id. In 1984,
Mr. Johnson filed a second amended complaint, adding two other IRS employees as defendants and
also adding another item of return information that he alleged had been wrongfully disclosed. See
id. Once again, the defendants moved for dismissal or for summary judgment on the ground that
there had been no I.R.C. § 6103 violation. See id. Mr. Johnson cross-moved for partial summary
judgment on the ground that the releases constituted a violation of I.R.C. § 6103. See id. In 1986,
the court ruled in favor of Mr. Johnson. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (S.D. Tex.
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when the IRS audited the joint income tax returns of Elvis Johnson and
his wife. Johnson was Senior Executive Vice President of the American
National Insurance Co. in Galveston, Texas.267 His job required that he
travel and entertain extensively,268 Some of his expenses were covered
under his company expense account and some were not.269 Those that
were not covered constituted deductible business expenses according to
the district court.270 As he returned from each business trip, Mr. Johnson
had his wife record his expenditures.2 ' This was an extensive job for
Mrs. Johnson, who had had no training other than what she had received
from her husband.7 On occasion, the task proved larger than Mrs.
Johnson's capabilities, and she resorted to some apparently accurate but
unorthodox accounting devices.7 For instance, when she encountered
a cash disbursement which she did not know how to record, she simply
altered a credit card receipt, increasing the amount shown on the receipt
by the exact amount of the cash disbursement.27" ' She then recorded this
amount in a daily summary, which she gave to her husband to transcribe
into a ledger to be given at the end of the year to their accountant, who
1
1986). In 1990, a bench trial was held on the severed FTCA claim. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 760
F. Supp. 1216, 1218 (S.D. Tex. 1991). The court once again held in favor of Mr. Johnson, awarding
him $10 million. See id.at 1233. This judgment was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. See Johnson v.
Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490, 1492 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the $10 million verdict); Johnson v. Sawyer,
4 F.3d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming the FTCA claim). Subsequently, however, the Fifth
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed with respect to the FTCA cause of action and remanded with
directions to dismiss this claim. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 738 (5th Cir. 1995). On
retrial, a jury eventually awarded Mr. Johnson $9 million. See Johnson v. Sawyer, Civ. A. No. H-83-
2173, 1996 WL 414050 (S.D. Tex. May 15, 1996). The IRS employees once again appealed the
decision.
For another egregious case of IRS abuse of a taxpayer in releasing confidential information, see
Ward v. U.S., 973 F. Supp. 996 (D. Colo. 1997).
267. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp at 1218.
268. See id at 1219.
269. See id.
270. See id. The view of the district court was that these expenses were deductible. See id.
According to the facts of the case, however, Mr. Johnson had the right to seek reimbursement for
all travel expenses for himself and his wife. See id. If that is the case, the expenses may not have
been deductible, in the view of the government, because the expenses are not considered "necessary"
under I.R.C. § 162. See Heidt v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 25, 28 (7th Cir. 1959) (holding that the
voluntary relinquishment of the right to reimbursement is a matter of personal choice and
convenience, and not a business necessity). Johnson was not entitled to seek reimbursement for
expenses involving the use of alcohol, so to the extent that the expenses were legitimate business
expenses that involved the use of alcohol, these expenses would have been deductible under I.R.C.
§ 162, although perhaps subject to limitations on deductibility under I.R.C. § 274.
271. See Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1219.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 1220.
HeinOnline  -- 47 U. Kan. L. Rev. 901 1998-1999
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
used it to prepare their income tax returns.2 75 Because of the alterations,
however, the credit card receipts did not match the ledger entries, and
when the receipts were examined by IRS agents during the audit, it was
obvious that the receipts had been altered.276
Mrs. Johnson employed two other accounting devices that caused
problems in the audit. One was to record in the daily summary of Mr.
Johnson's expenditures an amount of a credit card expenditure that
matched a cash expenditure of his where Mrs. Johnson was uncertain
what the cash expenditure represented.277 Thus, some of the expenses
that Mrs. Johnson transcribed in the ledger appeared to be attributable to
personal expenses. She also often arbitrarily allocated cash disburse-
ments among the various categories of expenditures, without knowing
precisely how the cash had been spent.278 Hence, the expenses of a given
period recorded in the ledger often did not correlate to Mr. Johnson's
activities at that time.279 Mr. Johnson would peruse the tallies at the end
of each month but he had no knowledge of his wife's "well-meaning but
eccentric" accounting procedures, nor was there any evidence of
fraudulent intent on the part of Mrs. Johnson.2"' These data were then
forwarded to their accountant.
During a routine audit, IRS examining agents uncovered the discrepan-
cies and referred the matter to the Criminal Investigation Division, which
in turn referred the case to the Justice Department, recommending a
prosecution for income tax evasion.2"' At this point, the alleged
deficiency was approximately $3500.282 During the course of the
examination, Mr. Johnson proclaimed his innocence, passed two
polygraph tests, and offered to pay the amount of any deficiency plus
interest and penalties.28 a The government declined this offer.
Instead, the U.S. Attorney handling the case offered the Johnsons a
plea bargain: if Mr. Johnson would plead guilty to one count of tax
evasion, Mrs. Johnson would riot be prosecuted, the Justice Department
would recommend a probated sentence for Mr. Johnson, and affirmative
efforts would be made to keep the fact of the prosecution from becoming
publicly known.284 For example, all papers filed in the case would list
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 1220-21.
281. See id. Mr. Johnson was prosecuted under I.R.C. § 7201 with respect to the joint income
tax returns for 1974 and 1975. See id. at 1221.
282. See id. at 1221 n.3.
283. See id. at 1221.
284. See id.
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Mr. Johnson's given name, Elvis, rather than E.E. or Johnny, as he was
otherwise known; his attorney's office address would be listed in lieu of
Johnson's home address; the information would be filed late on a Friday
afternoon in an effort to make the proceeding as private as possible; and
the Justice Department would not publish a press release." 5
On April 10, 1981, with no spectators present, Mr. Johnson pleaded
guilty to one count of tax evasion2" and received a probated sentence.
The district court summary judgment opinion noted that "as [Mr.]
Johnson entered the weekend of April I1 and 12, 1981, he had good
reason to believe that he had handled a difficult situation in the most
sensible way possible, and that he had, at the cost of pleading guilty to
a crime of which he did not feel himself guilty, protected both his wife
and his career."287 But on April 15, a Galveston journalist called the
offices of American National to inquire about Mr. Johnson's conviction,
stating that he had learned of this from an IRS news release."' The news
release had contained Mr. Johnson's full name and current home address,
contrary to the terms of the plea bargain.28 9 It also gave his age,
occupation, and place of employment, as well as the conviction and the
sentence.290 It further erroneously stated that Mr. Johnson had pleaded
guilty to criminal offenses involving two taxable years.29 ' Finally, it gave
the impression that Mr. Johnson had admitted to altering documents and
falsifying deductions.292
The IRS mailed this release to at least twenty-one media outlets in the.
Galveston area.293 When informed by Mr. Johnson's attorney that the
press release contained erroneous data, the IRS placed a hold on the
release, and over the attorney's objections, it reissued a corrected release
on April 17, again disclosing Mr. Johnson's full name, age, address and
occupation.294 The IRS officer who authorized the erroneous release did
not verify the data by checking the public record, but instead relied solely
on the special agent's information.295 Moreover, the officer did not check
with either the Justice Department or the U.S. Attorney to determine the
285. See id.
286. See id. at 1222. This count pertained to the 1975 joint income tax return only.
287. Id.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id. The information charged tax evasion with respect to only one taxable year. See
supra note 286 and accompanying text.
292. See Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1222.
293. See id.
294. See id,
295. See id at 1223-24.
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terms of any plea bargain, contrary to what the officer was required to do
under the IRS District Director's guidelines.296
Mr. Johnson had previously obtained the assurance of his superiors that
the conviction would not affect his job status as long as there was no
publicity.297 When the release was issued, Mr. Johnson was demoted, he
was forced to sell his home, and he was transferred from the Galveston
office to the Springfield, Missouri office as a field agent.29 Because he
was no longer an executive with the company, he was obligated to retire
at age 65, instead of at age 70 as he had planned.2
Mr. Johnson filed suit against the various IRS employees involved in
the prosecution and news release, and against the U.S. Attorney, alleging
wrongful disclosure of tax return information in violation of the Internal
Revenue Code.3°" He requested $54 million in actual and punitive
damages.3°  The district court concluded that the release constituted a
disclosure of return information which fell under no enumerated
exception. 2 The government argued that Mr. Johnson had no expecta-
tion of privacy in the information released because it was "incidental to
information already in the public record."3"3 The court noted that the
code provision in question was enacted in response to the wrongful use
of tax return information for political purposes during the Watergate
era.'" The court further noted that the provision encourages voluntary
compliance with the self-assessment system by assuring taxpayers of the
confidentiality of their returns.305
296. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1997). There was apparently
some discrepancy in the testimony of the IRS employee and the U.S. Attorney as to whether the U.S.
Attorney had been consulted prior to the release. See id. The jury ultimately decided, however, that
the U.S. Attorney had not authorized the release. See id. at 1314.
297. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp. 1216, 1222-23 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
298. See id.
299. See id. at 1223 nA.
300. See Id. at 1217.
301. See id. The $54 million represented actual and punitive damages under I.R.C. § 7217
(repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-248 (1982)). See id. Section 7217 was replaced with section 7431
which permits a cause of action against the U.S. for violations of I.R.C. § 6103 by any federal
employee. Section 7431 applies to wrongful disclosures made after September 3, 1982, the date of
enactment. For a discussion of the p6licy rationale behind the change, see Karnes & Lirely, supra
note 264, at 930-33. Because the disclosures in Johnson's case were made in 1981, the action was
governed by prior law, section 7217. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1313.
302. See Johnson, 640 F. Supp. at 1133.
303. Id. at 1132.
304. See id. at 1132 n.17.
305. See id. at 1132 (citing Rueckert v. IRS, 775 F.2d 208, 210 (7th Cir. 1985)).
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The court concluded that the government's actions had not been
undertaken in good faith3 6 and it awarded Mr. Johnson nearly $11
million.30 7 The government appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed
the district court's holding that the IRS agents had violated the nondisclo-
sure provision of the Internal Revenue Code,s but after a tortuous path
through the appellate process,30 9 the Fifth Circuit ultimately held that one
of Mr. Johnson's causes of action under the Federal Tort Claims
Recovery Act precluded such suits against the government.10
Mr. Johnson then sued the five individual IRS officers who were
allegedly responsible for the release.31' In April 1996, a Houston jury
awarded Mr. Johnson $9 million.12 On August 21, 1997, the Fifth
Circuit once again reversed the district court, remanding the case on the
ground that the jury instructions were overly broad.31 3 On January 23,
1998, shortly before the new trial was scheduled to begin, a settlement
was reached.3t4 Pending final approval by the Department of Justice, Mr.
Johnson will receive $3.5 million.31'
The courts are currently split on the issue of whether tax return
confidentiality extends to information in the public record. Most of the
courts that have considered this issue have held that such information is
306. See id at 1133-34. Section 7217 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a good faith
disclosure of return information contrary to the provisions of section 6103 would excuse government
employees from liability. See I.R.C. § 7217 (1994). The court determined, however, that the IRS
employees had not acted in good faith because any competent person should have known that the
disclosure of the information in this case was contrary to the provisions of section 6103. See id.
Moreover, the IRS Public Affairs Officer, in releasing the data, acted contrary to the District
Director's guidelines. See id.
An unresolved issue is what standard of good faith should be used-an objective or a subjective
test of the agent's actions, or an objective test of the government's actions. See Karnes & Lirely,
supra note 264, at 954-56.
307. See Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1233. Of this amount, over $5.9 million was for economic
loss resulting from Mr. Johnson's demotion, and $5 million was for emotional distress and mental
anguish. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 980 F.2d 1490, 1504 (5th Cir. 1992) (describing the breakdown
of damages awarded before recalculation).
308. See Johnson, 980 F.2d at 1505.
309. See id. at 738-39 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (discussing the prior proceedings).
310. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 738-39 (5th Cir. 1995).
311. See Verdicts Reversed After Trial, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at C17.
312. This figure included $3 million in punitive damages. The amount was increased by the trial
court to around $14 million, consisting of $1.2 million in attorney's fees and $4 million in
prejudgment interest. See id.
313. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1338 (5th Cir. 1997).
314. See Verdicts Reversed After Trial, supra note 311, at C17.
315. See id.
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not protected under the statute." 6 Others have held that confidentiality
or privacy is not the issue. Instead, the issue is whether the information
is protected under the statute, and if so, the government's disclosure is
unauthorized.3"7
None of these opinions has been as well reasoned as the final
decision in Johnson v. Sawyer,"' rendered by the Fifth Circuit in 1997.
In declining to follow the examples of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits,
which have held that matters of public record are not subject to the
Code's disclosure bar, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the plain meaning
of the statute does not provide for such an exception.3"9 Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit found that following the list of express disclosure exceptions
in the statute is a list of "Safeguards," under which federal agencies to
whom the IRS may disclose return information are required to take
certain steps to guarantee the security of the information."' If any of the
information becomes part of a public record, as in a judicial or adminis-
trative proceeding, the safeguards no longer apply. 2' There is no express
exception for the IRS from nondisclosure of such information. 22 Thus,
deduced the court, Congress did not intend to provide an implicit
exception for such information.323
Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress considered the possibility
that the IRS would need to issue public notifications disclosing the
identity of some taxpayers, as in the case in which the taxpayer is entitled
316. See, e.g., William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1490
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that there is no violation of I.R.C. § 6103 when the information in question
was in the public domain and therefore no longer confidential); Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d
335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Once tax return information is made a part of the public domain, the
taxpayer may no longer claim a right of privacy in that information.").
317. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that even if the
information was no longer considered confidential, disclosure was, nevertheless, unauthorized);
Chandler v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (D. Utah 1988) ("[P]rior in court exposure of
.. . return information is not relevant to the decision whether the IRS unlawfully disclosed the
information. ), affg 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1991). The Sixth Circuit, relying on
Schrambling, has distinguished disclosures of information in publicly recorded tax liens from
information pursuant to a judicial proceeding. See Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 801 (6th
Cir. 1996) (stating that the recording of a federal tax lien is designed to provide public notice and
is thus qualitatively different from disclosures made in judicial proceedings, which are only
incidentally made public). It is interesting to note that, in Schrambling, the case dealt with the
disclosure of information in a federal tax lien and in a bankruptcy petition. See Schrambling, 937
F.2d at 1489-90. The court reserved judgment on whether confidential return information disclosed
through improperly issued levies would constitute a violation of I.R.C. § 6103. See id at 1490.
318. 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997).
319. See id at 1318-19.
320. See id. at 1320-21.
321. See id. at 1320 (relying upon I.R.C. § 6 103(p)(4 ) (1994)).
322. See id. at 1320-21.
323. See id. at 1321.
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to a refund and the IRS, "after reasonable effort and lapse of time, has
been unable to locate such persons." '324 According to the Johnson court,
this recognition gives further credence to the assumption that the
omission of public record information from the enumerated disclosure
exceptions was intentional.325
The court then examined the rationale of the nondisclosure provision
and concluded that Congress intended to provide confidentiality to
taxpayers to encourage compliance with the voluntary assessment
system.326 By prohibiting disclosure of all return information, issues of
ad hoc determinations of what is and is not subject to the prohibition are
avoided.327 As the court noted, "[i]n enacting . . . a prophylactic ban,
Congress was determining that a taxpayer has a statutorily created
'privacy' interest in all his tax return information, despite the fact that
some of it is not entirely 'secret."' 328 The court opined that the test for
determining whether return information can be lawfully disclosed by the
government is the source of the information, not its status as "private" or
"confidential." '329 If the source of the information is not the return or
internal documents based on the return, the information may be dis-
closed.33°
Finally, the defendants raised a First Amendment claim which the court
rejected on two grounds.33" ' First, the First Amendment applies differently
to government employees than it does to members of the media, because
government employees have "no First Amendment responsibility to report
on criminal proceedings or other government operations." '332 Second,
government employees are specifically prohibited by law from disclosing
return information.333 Thus, they have no First Amendment protection
with respect to such disclosures.334
At least one commentator believes that the better approach is that
espoused by the government-that information disclosed in a judicial
proceeding or other public record is no longer confidential, and therefore
324. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 6103(m)(1)).
325. See id.
326. See id. at 1322-23.
327. See id. at 1322 (quoting Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 735 (5th Cir. 1995)).
328. Id. at 1323.
329. Id.
330. See id.; see alsoThomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that IRS
could publicize information garnered from a Tax Court opinion).
331. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1323-24.
332. Id. at 1324.
333. See I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1994).
334. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1324.
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loses its statutory protection against disclosure.33 There are problems,
however, with such wholesale disclosure. First is the unresolved issue of
erroneous disclosure of return information or wrongful levy. 36 The
government should not be allowed to hide behind a public record
exception where the information is not legitimately a part of the public
record. Second, the release of information to the media that has been
previously disclosed in a judicial proceeding causes the information to
become more widely disseminated than it would otherwise have been.
The consequences to the taxpayer may be dire, as the case of Johnson v.
Sawyer so well illustrates. This puts the taxpayer in a position of having
to choose between the statutory protection against disclosure of confiden-
tial return information and the right to litigate an issue in court. 37 This
is an untenable position for the taxpayer, and surely cannot be what
Congress intended.
The government has two general reasons for disclosing return
information. One is to assist the investigation and collection process, and
the other is to encourage and improve voluntary compliance by publiciz-
ing the prosecutions of those who evade their tax liability. Both of these
are legitimate and important governmental interests. Nevertheless, it does
not follow that the ends justified the means in the case of Johnson v.
Sawyer. In the release of information during the investigation and
collection process, the disclosure must be necessary to obtain the
information sought.33 In determining whether the disclosure is necessary,
the courts will look to whether the information is "otherwise reasonably
available."339 Thus, the interests of the government are weighed against
the taxpayer's right to privacy. This should also be the case with respect
to the disclosure of information otherwise in the public record, because
the release of such information may have devastating consequences to the
taxpayer. Even if we were to assume that the information in Johnson v.
Sawyer could have been released without violating the prohibition against
disclosure, where there are extenuating circumstances, as there were in
that case, these circumstances should have been taken into account in the
initial determination of whether to release the information to the media.
Thus, even if the disclosure issue is ultimately resolved in favor of the
government, the courts should require the government to consider the
335. See J. Hudson Duffalo, Comment, The Buttoned Lip: The Controversy Surrounding the
Disclosure of Tax Return Information, 53 ALB. L. REv. 937, 963 (1989).
336. See generally Karnes & Lirely, supra note 264, at 948-51 (discussing wrongful levies and
other wrongful disclosures).
337. See id. at 964.
338. See generally id. at 940-48 (discussing the limitations on disclosures in the process of
investigation and collection).
339. Id. at 941 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 795 F.2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1986)).
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underlying circumstances before disclosing the information to the media.
Thus, the need for disclosure should be weighed against the taxpayer's
right to privacy, even though the disclosure follows a conviction.
V. CONCLUSION
The difficulties normally inherent in resolving ethical problems in the
general practice of law are compounded in the practice of tax law, not
only because of the complexity of the substantive issues but also because
of the nature of tax practice with its extra layers of ethical rules. These
difficulties are further worsened by the tension and lack of meaningful
dialogue between the IRS and the ABA, which create particular problems
for lawyers who prepare returns, as defined under the Code and
regulations.
While it has been stated that tax lawyers have a separate duty to the
tax system, this author maintains that should not be the case. The
lawyer's only duty should be to obey the rules of law and ethics,
although obedience to the rules of ethics may sometimes involve
significant judgment calls by the attorney and a careful balancing of the
rules of professional ethics of the various state bar associations with the
ethics rules imposed by the government under Circular 230. A particular
problem arises in balancing the tensions and conflicts between the ethics
rules of Circular 230 and the preparer penalty provision under the Code
on the one hand with the corresponding taxpayer penalty provision on the
other hand.
A further problem for lawyers who prepare returns is the issue of the
extent to which the attorney-client privilege applies. The position of the
government is that the attorney-client privilege has a very narrow
application and does not apply at all when the attorney is functioning as
an accountant or a scrivener. This rationale has been based, in part, on
the fact that there was no comparable accountant-client privilege and that
when a lawyer performed the same role as an accountant, the attorney-
client privilege did not apply.
It is currently unclear what effect, if any, the newly enacted nonlawyer-
client privilege will have on the government's view of the attorney-client
privilege. It is likely, however, that the new privilege will have minimal,
if any, effect because the newly enacted privilege is fraught with
limitations, one of them being that the new privilege is subject to the
interpretations of the federal common law as it has been applied to the
attorney-client privilege. While the rationale behind much of the federal
common law interpretations of the attorney-client privilege may involve
circular reasoning as far as the newly enacted privilege is concerned,
nevertheless, Congress has explicitly stated that the new privilege is
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subject to the interpretations of the federal common law as it has evolved
under the attorney-client privilege.
One effect the new privilege is likely to have is that the door will be
opened wider for accountants, enrolled agents, and others entitled to
practice before the IRS to encroach upon the practice of law. Law
practice in the twenty-first century is likely to be very different from
what it is today. As we are poised on the brink of the twenty-first
century, the opportunity is ripe for the ABA both to reconsider its
position on the prohibition of fee-sharing arrangements and to establish
a meaningful dialogue with the IRS to resolve the tensions that have
existed for the past thirty years. This opportunity is an important one not
only for tax lawyers in particular, but for the legal profession in general.
Because of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,340 the IRS
is currently undergoing a reorganization. Thus, the time is also ripe for
the Supreme Court to seize the opportunity when it next presents itself to
resolve the conflict among the circuits on whether the government's duty
to maintain the confidentiality of tax return information applies to
information elicited at a public trial. If it should be determined that
information in the public domain is no longer subject to confidentiality
protection, the Court then needs to clarify whether there are any
circumstances that might constitute an exception to this lack of confiden-
tiality, such as the Johnson situation in which efforts were taken to make
the proceeding less public.
If the government's duty of confidentiality with respect to return
information is limited, there is a danger that taxpayers may be victimized
by the government because of their stature in the community rather than
because of the seriousness of their offense. Until this issue is resolved,
attorneys representing high profile clients should be aware that there is
a greater danger of victimization by the government if the case should
proceed to trial.
These issues are important ones that should be addressed by the ABA,
the government and the courts as the legal profession hovers on the brink
of a new era.
340. Pub. L. No. 105-206 § 1103, 112 Stat. 730 (July 22, 1998).
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